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I
INTRODUCTION

I

n the longstanding debate over the proper place of the Treaty
Power in the Constitution’s federal structure, on the one hand
there are Federalists and on the other hand there are federalists.1
During the ratification of the Constitution, many Federalists believed
the national government needed an expansive Treaty Power to
preserve the nascent union.2 Today, many federalists see such a
Treaty Power as a potential threat to the sovereignty of the states.3
Between 1998 and 2000, the Michigan Law Review published a series
of articles by Curtis Bradley4 and David Golove5 on competing
conceptions of how the Treaty Power fits in the Constitution’s
federal structure. Bradley argued that federalism delimits the capacity
of the national government to create binding national law through
the forging of treaties.6 That is, the national government may not
invade the sovereign province of the states by using the Treaty Power
to circumvent the restrictions placed on the national government by
federalism. In contrast, Golove argued that the national government

1. In this paper, I discuss the ideological positions of both the historical political group
known as the “Federalists,” and modern-day legal philosophers known as “federalists.”
Throughout, I capitalize the name of the historical political party and do not capitalize the name
of the modern legal philosophers.
2. See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 242–46 (2005) (discussing John Jay’s
ideal of a strong executive, especially in the international arena); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John
Jay). Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jay saw this as necessary even before ratification. STAHR, supra,
at 186, 203.
3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.
390 (1998); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867
(2005) (reviewing textual, historical, and practical reasons for cabining the Treaty Power).
4. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 98, 122–23 (2000); Bradley, supra note 3.
5. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conceptions of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
6. Bradley, supra note 4, at 98.
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may use the Treaty Power to legislate in areas generally reserved to
the states so long as the Constitution does not explicitly prevent it.7
Unfortunately, neither author’s argument addressed the history of
the most important constitutional event bearing on the issue—the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.
In this Essay, I make two arguments. First, I argue that the
national government may not use the Treaty Power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment protections.8 The Eleventh Amendment
voided specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace that states feared
would grant British creditors actionable claims against them and, by
cabining the Treaty Power, additionally prevented the national
government from negotiating a new treaty that would have held
states accountable for their denials of British claims. Whatever the
original meaning of the Treaty Power was at the Framing, the
Eleventh Amendment redefined and curtailed it dramatically. In fact,
the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment saw the Supremacy Clause,
and the policy reasons underlying it, not as grounds to tolerate an
expansive Treaty Power, but rather as the very reasons to amend the
Constitution. The background of the Eleventh Amendment as a
response to the Treaty of Peace does not resolve all questions in the
debate between Golove and Bradley, but it does provide a more
complete picture of the constitutional balance between the national
and state governments in light of the Treaty Power.
Second, I argue that the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment
to protect themselves from out-of-state plaintiffs—but only out-of-

7. Golove, supra note 5, at 1078.
8. Throughout this Essay, I refer distinctly to the barriers provided by the Eleventh
Amendment and those provided by state sovereign immunity, which is the broader constitutional
principal partly expressed in the Eleventh Amendment, partly in the Tenth Amendment, and
partly implicitly expressed in the Constitution.
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state plaintiffs—with claims based on diversity or federal question
jurisdiction.9 The states ratified the Eleventh Amendment in reaction
to Chisholm v. Georgia but did so more as Chisholm pertained to
British creditors than as Chisholm pertained to American, out-ofstate creditors.10 As a domestic policy measure, the Eleventh
Amendment protected interests within each state and simultaneously
cut short the emergence of a national court that could have held
states accountable for practices that were discriminatory, corrupt, or
dangerous to national security. As a foreign policy measure, the
Eleventh Amendment expressed American outrage over Britain’s
refusal to evacuate military posts in the Northwest and expressed the
American refusal to pay debts to British creditors.11 To protect states
from British creditors, the ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment had
to preclude British merchants from bringing treaty-based claims
under either federal question or diversity jurisdiction. They did not
have to preclude in-state plaintiffs from bringing federal question
claims, because British merchants could not practicably assign their
claims to in-state plaintiffs. Competing interpretations of the
Eleventh Amendment insufficiently consider its purpose as a foreign
policy measure.12
9. This interpretation is consistent with Lawrence Marshall’s methodology and reading of
the text of the amendment itself. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1346 (1989). I discuss Marshall’s theory in Part IV.A.
10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) (1793) (holding that American, out-of-state
creditors could bring suits against states for money damages). See infra Part III.B.
11. In the Treaty of Peace, the United States promised that the claims of British creditors
would be heard and fairly paid, and Britain promised it would remove its military forces from the
Northwest Territory. See infra Part III.A.
12. See, e.g., William Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130 (1983); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)
(noting the “profound shock” theory of the Eleventh Amendment); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY 101 (rev. ed. 1926). I discuss these theories more in Part IV.B.
Although some thinkers have advanced non-historical interpretive frameworks for understanding
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court’s decisions have emphasized history as the interpretive
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In Part II, I outline the tensions in the relationship between the
Treaty Power and state sovereign immunity. I begin by sketching out
pertinent portions of the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence and its probable collision with the Treaty Power. In
Part II.A, I briefly describe the text, structural placement, and history
of the Treaty Power. In Part II.B, I summarize the positions of two
camps on the Treaty Power: (1) nationalists, who contend that the
Treaty Power may be used to abrogate state sovereign immunity; and
(2) federalists, who believe that broad concerns of federalism
preclude such abrogation. In Part III, I recount the history of the
Eleventh Amendment as a response to the implications of the Treaty
of Peace, the threat to the states of Chisholm’s precedent for British
creditors, the War Crisis of the mid-1790s, and the political
exigencies of Democratic-Republicans and Federalists. In Part IV, I
explain the implications of this history for both the debate on the
Treaty Power and the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. I
conclude that, regardless of any balance struck in the original
framework with which to understand the Eleventh Amendment for over two hundred years.
Christopher Hart & Mark Sigmon, Getting Past Originalism in the Doctrine of State Sovereign
Immunity (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and
Public Policy); see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 735 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996); Hans, 134 U.S. at 18; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
406 (1821). Remarkably, the Court has concentrated on historical evidence, despite a dearth of
direct evidence on the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment—there are virtually no records of
either congressional debates or state ratification debates. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1350. This
reliance on history is a testament to the endurance of originalism, despite the many pitfalls that
many authors have discussed. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112
HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). The
Eleventh Amendment is a provision so lost in history that it has been constructed and
reconstructed based on purported original meaning in radically different ways. See generally Hart
& Sigmon, supra. At times, these originalist intepretations have been palpably divorced from the
text of the Amendment itself. William Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1378 (1989). But, if history must guide the
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and there are few documents to reveal its historical
background, then any reasonable interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment must at least reflect
the prevailing political exigencies of the 1790s. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355.
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Constitution on the Treaty Power, the history of the Eleventh
Amendment indicates that the Treaty Power may not be used to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.13 I also conclude that the states
ratified the Eleventh Amendment to cover only out-of-state plaintiffs
bringing claims against states under federal question and diversity
jurisdiction.
II
FEDERALISM AND THE TREATY POWER
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has altered the
balance of federalism by curbing Congress’s powers under Article I
and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though
the Court has so far only curtailed Congress’s ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Congress’s powers under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 and Article I,15
the Court might soon face the issue of abrogation through the use of
the Treaty Power. The Treaty Power occupies a unique constitutional
position because of its roots in two separate branches of government
and its specific incorporation of state interests in crafting national
policy. These unique traits underlie the debate over its use as a tool to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.

13. Or, to the extent that state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment represent
distinct sources of protections for states, the Treaty Power may not be used to abrogate those
protections afforded by the Eleventh Amendment.
14. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 451 (2000) (discussing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). According to Post and Siegel, “Eleventh Amendment immunity,
however, can be abrogated by legislation enacted ‘pursuant to Congress’s Section [sic] 5 power.’
The upshot is that the scope of Section 5 power has now become the measure of what federal antidiscrimination legislation may effectively be applied to the states.” Id.
15. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996).
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A. Recent Federalism Jurisprudence and Treaties
The Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence has circumscribed
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the United States Supreme Court
began to demand “congruence and proportionality” between the
violation of a judicially-defined right at issue and the remedy or
prophylactic proposed by Congress.16 Boerne concerned the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
which Congress had passed to “restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.”17 In formulating its decision in
Boerne, the Court sought to ensure that legislation passed pursuant
to the Enforcement Clause merely enforces—not redefines or
creates—substantive rights.18 The Court’s limitation on Congress’s
Enforcement Clause powers in Boerne connotes where Congress may
abrogate Eleventh Amendment protections.19
The Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid followed Boerne.
Congress passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act to explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity in
1992, and College Savings Bank, a business that financed college
expenses, quickly filed suit against an entity created by the state of
Florida that infringed on College Savings Bank’s business
methodology.20 Having already required Congress to indicate
explicitly its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity,21 and

16. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994). The compelling interest test refers to state action
infringing on religious freedom.
18. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
19. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 451.
20. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630–31.
21. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
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having already held that Congress generally could not abrogate state
sovereign immunity when legislating solely under its Article I
powers,22 the Court in Florida Prepaid struck down Congress’s
statutory abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment because Congress had not produced a
legislative record sufficient to justify remedial efforts.23
Would the law struck down in Florida Prepaid have fared any
better if had it been cast as a statute enforcing a treaty or simply as a
self-executing treaty—not as a mere statute? Today, few treaties
include provisions granting causes of action against states.24 Yet, the
national government has contemplated and even ratified such
treaties. In the early 1950s, the Truman Administration began
negotiating a human rights covenant that would have protected the
civil liberties of individuals within the United States beyond what the
United States Supreme Court then required under the Fourteenth
Amendment.25 In response to these negotiations, Senator John
Bricker (R-Oh.) sought to curtail the Treaty Power by constitutional
amendment.26 In 1954, he came within one vote of passing a
resolution in the Senate to cabin the Treaty Power’s domestic

22. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 126 S. Ct. 990, 995–1005 (2006) (discussing how the Bankruptcy Clause does
not implicate the same kind of state sovereign power as other Article I powers and hence does not
implicate sovereign immunity notwithstanding Seminole Tribe); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp.
v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
23. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 628. Similar results have been reached in several other cases. See,
e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
24. These few treaties include the Warsaw Convention, the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, and the Bilateral Air Transport Service Agreement between Panama and the
United States. Cory Eichhorn, Comment, Eleventh Amendment Immunity Jurisprudence in an Era
of Globalization: The Tension Between State Sovereign Rights and Federal Treaty Obligations, 32 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 523, 535 (2001).
25. Golove, supra note 5, at 1274.
26. Id. at 1275.
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legislative scope within those subject matters that Congress otherwise
may govern under Article I, section 8.27 Forty years later, these
human rights treaties came back into fashion. In the early 1990s, the
United States ratified three human rights treaties: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Torture Convention, and
the Race Convention.28 In none of these treaties does the United
States outline a comprehensive enforcement scheme to remedy
violations of human rights by states within the United States, and in
none of these treaties did the Senate foreclose a remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which protects treaty-based rights.29 Hence, these
treaties might be enforceable against state organs and officers under
§ 1983.30 But could the Treaty Power be used to take the last step—
making states themselves, not just their organs and officers, liable for
violations of civil rights?31
When Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity, and thereby
allows claims against a state, Congress seeks to remedy and prevent
violations of important rights. Yet, the Eleventh Amendment
delimits the statutory remedies afforded to individuals. Should
remedies created through the Treaty Power be different—impervious
to Eleventh Amendment qualifications? Among scholars, a lively
debate continues over the proper balance between the Treaty Power
and federalism.

27. Id.
28. David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations,
75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1107–08 (2000).
29. Id. at 1142.
30. Id. at 1142–44, 1154–55.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
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B. The Treaty Power: Text, Structure, and History
The Treaty Power is special. Unlike other powers of the national
government, it is neither exclusively legislative nor executive in
nature, but has components of both.32 Under the Constitution, the
power to make treaties is entrusted to the President and the Senate:
“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.”33 Treaties are also mentioned in the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI: “This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”34 Under the

32. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 245 (1997); Susan Bandes, Comment, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and ‘The Plan
of the Convention,’ 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 748 (2002); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), NO.
75 (Alexander Hamilton).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34. Id. art. VI, § 2. According to constitutional doctrine, only self-executing treaties are
“supreme” under Article VI. Golove, supra note 5, at 1311. Yet, Congress may pass legislation
implementing non-self-executing treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if that
means legislating on issues outside of its powers but for the treaty. Golove, supra note 5, at 1099–
1100, 1311–12. Ever since Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), this structural argument has
included the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this Essay, use of the “Treaty Power”
denotes either the creation of a self-executing treaty or the passage of implementing legislation
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the analysis for investigating whether laws
passed by Congress to execute treaties are subject to the Eleventh Amendment essentially runs
parallel to the analysis for whether self-executing treaties are subject to the Eleventh Amendment.
Generally, statutes creating claims against states are not permissible. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). Yet, Congress may pass such laws under some circumstances, even
beyond their Enforcement Clause powers. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 126 S.
Ct. 990, 995–1005 (2006). In fact, Katz fits squarely within the Treaty Power nationalist camp. It
regards the Eleventh Amendment as a reiteration of the original understanding of the federalstate balance, but concludes that the Framing extinguished at least some aspects of state
sovereignty, including sovereign power in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. Treaty Power nationalists
certainly make similar claims about how states surrendered sovereignty over international affairs
to the national government during the Framing. See infra Part II.C.1.
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original, unamended Constitution, the judicial power of the United
States extended to cases under treaties.35
The Treaty Power is also special because of its placement within
the structure of the Constitution and its notable, practical differences
from the legislative powers described in Article I. These structural
aspects convey its distinctiveness among governmental powers.36 The
Treaty Power is not found in Article I, which addresses the legislative
branch, but in Article II, which addresses the executive branch.37
Though Article I does contain some language relevant to treaties, it
simply and explicitly prevents states from negotiating international
matters.38
The different procedural requirements for creating a treaty vis-àvis a statute also suggest the special status of the Treaty Power. There
are two routes by which a normal piece of congressional legislation
may become law. First, it may be passed by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President.39 Second, it may be passed by two thirds
of both houses over a President’s veto.40 These routes are each
different from the requirements for passage of a treaty, which
requires a supermajority of present Senators and, in all
circumstances, the President’s concurrence.41 As a general matter,

35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22
(1969); see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000);
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
37. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–II.
38. Id. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”).
39. Id. art. I, § 7.
40. Id. art. I, § 8.
41. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Golove, supra note 5, at 1299.
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these requirements make it far more difficult to pass treaties than
normal legislation.42
Both the text and structure of the Treaty Power reflect the
historical developments of the United States. Under the Articles of
Confederation, the national government had tremendous difficulties
in binding states to duties that the national government had
negotiated in treaties.43 The Framers of the Constitution drew three
principal lessons from these difficulties. First, practical vetoes by
individual states on the enforcement of treaties could create severe
embarrassment and even war if states failed to live up to the promises
made by the national government.44 Second, the national government
needed enough power to ensure that the international obligations it
negotiated would be observed by the states.45 Third, treaties
absolutely had to supersede conflicting provisions of state law.46
Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay crystallized these lessons in a
report to the Continental Congress on October 13, 1786.47 Jay’s
report focused on how the states had expressly delegated their power
over foreign affairs to Congress and could no longer participate in

42. Golove, supra note 5, at 1299. Because treaties are so difficult to pass, congressionalexecutive agreements, which require the same procedures as normal legislation, have become
preferred in recent years as a method of creating international agreements. Id. at 1297.
43. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713,
728 (2002).
44. JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 27 (1970); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).
45. COMBS, supra note 44, at 27; RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 26–28.
46. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 173; Golove, supra note 5, at 1103–04; Vasquez, supra note 43,
at 729.
47. JOHN JAY, CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON ‘STATE LAWS CONTRARY TO THE TREATY OF
PEACE’ (1786), reprinted in 2 THE EMERGING NATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1780–
1789, at 333, 334 (Mary A. Guinta and J. Dane Hartgrove eds., Wash. Nat’l Historical Publ’ns and
Records Comm’n) (1996) [hereinafter Jay Report].
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foreign affairs except through their congressional delegates.48 In
addition to having delegated their power, Jay argued that the states
were incompetent to make treaties.49 In his report, Jay specified and
evaluated the state laws that, according to British diplomats, violated
the Treaty of Peace.50 Finally, Jay outlined a legislative program to
repeal in a uniform manner state laws contradicting the Treaty of
Peace.51 Although the report languished in Congress for months, it
was eventually turned into legislation in March of 1787, and weeks
later its concerns prompted the framing of the Supremacy Clause and
the Treaty Power.52
The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, federal
statutes passed under the Constitution, and treaties made under
authority of the United States as supreme law.53 The Supremacy
Clause notably includes as supreme law those treaties negotiated
before the Framing, like the Treaty of Peace, that were made under
the authority of the United States even if not made pursuant to the
Constitution.54 Yet, to ensure that the national government did not
use the Supremacy Clause to allow treaties to run roughshod over
state interests (perhaps to the point of even surrendering a state to
end a war), the Framers included the many procedural hurdles to

48. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. Although this remark seems intuitive today, it was radical at
the time. Id.
49. Jay Report, supra note 47, at 334.
50. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. Jay concluded that New York, Virginia, and South Carolina
laws contradicted the Treaty but could not determine whether North Carolina or Georgia laws
also did, because he did not have updated copies of their laws. Id. at 203–04.
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 205–06, 246. The congressional legislation caused most states to drop much of their
anti-British legislation. Id. at 206, 296. In Virginia, however, whose debtors owed more than the
debtors of any other states, the British still could not win relief in either state or federal court. Id.
at 297.
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; STAHR, supra note 2, at 246.
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treatymaking discussed above.55 Moreover, the Framers placed the
duty of advice and consent in the Senate, with its equal
representation of states, rather than the House of Representatives,
with its proportional representation,56 because they thought the
Senate would better represent state interests on a national level.57 The
Framers also protected state interests by adding a minority veto on
treaties by requiring two-thirds of the Senate to concur.58
These designs suggest that the Framers created a robust and
expansive Treaty Power checked by procedural safeguards meant to
incorporate state interests. But how does that carefully struck balance
operate if the national government makes a treaty abrogating state
sovereign immunity by promising that states will be held accountable
in federal courts? Does the necessity of these procedural safeguards
within the Constitution suggest that the Court must shield states
from a power-hungry President and Senate? Or does the presence of
these safeguards suggest that the Court should leave defense of state
interests to the states because such strong protections and
incorporation of state interests already exist?
C. The Nationalists and the Federalists on the Treaty Power
1. The Nationalist Position
Treaty Power nationalists argue that the Treaty Power should be
available to abrogate state sovereign immunity for several reasons:
55. EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY 65–67 (1913); Golove, supra note 5, at
1135; Vazquez, supra note 43, at 728.
56. CORWIN, supra note 55, at 65–67; Golove, supra note 5, at 1135.
57. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 168 (2d ed.
1996); RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 170; Bradley, supra note 3, at 412. Now, with control over
congressional redistricting in the hands of state legislatures, it may be more accurate, albeit
cynical, to say that U.S. Representatives, not Senators, best represent state interests at the national
level.
58. Golove, supra note 5, at 1296–97.
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(1) treaties are part of “foreign affairs exceptionalism;” (2) the
inclusion of states in the treatymaking process fulfills the need to
recognize state interests; and (3) federalism is not an explicit
provision of the Constitution, and therefore cannot curb the Treaty
Power under Court doctrine.
The first major argument of Treaty Power nationalists is that
foreign affairs are so delicate and important that state sovereign
immunity should not challenge the dominance of the national
government in the arena of foreign affairs. Justice James Wilson
wrote in Chisholm that, “as to the purposes of the Union,” the states
are not sovereign.59 Even though the Eleventh Amendment nullified
Chisholm, modern Treaty Power nationalists have attempted to
resurrect Wilson’s idea by emphasizing the importance of the Treaty
Power to the national government. According to Eichhorn:
The Supreme Court should not set forth a plan that allows states
to avail themselves of their Eleventh Amendment immunity in
the face of international obligations because of the traditional
view of treaties as a uniform law which all states must abide, the
possibility of private actors having no forum to enforce their
rights, and the serious consequences that such a decision could
have on international trade and the United States’ position as a
world power.60

Because of the potentially serious consequences of breaking
international promises, nations are generally not permitted under
international law to invoke constitutional restrictions, including
federal structure, as an excuse for breach.61

59. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793).
60. Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 534; see Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State
Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 755–56 (2002) (discussing how treaties might
abrogate state sovereign immunity more appropriately and easily than federal statutes).
61. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
403, 450 (2003). According to Professor Swaine, “[n]ations with federal systems should consider
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Professor Bandes agrees with Eichhorn’s conclusion based not on
foreign affairs exceptionalism, but because of a second reason—the
incorporation of state interests into the treatymaking process.62
According to this argument, the designation of the Senate as the
ratifying body and the minority veto in that body both prevent easy
treatymaking.63 The Senate was an especially state-oriented body
before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, because
state legislatures, not statewide popular elections, chose U.S.
Senators.64 If each state has its say in the formation of treaties, no
state should be able to evade its responsibility under those treaties.
The third major thread of nationalist thought on the Treaty
Power derives from Court doctrine, chiefly Missouri v. Holland.65 In
Holland, the Court addressed the power of the national government
to regulate intrastate affairs, such as wildlife management.66 Justice
Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v. Holland blesses the nationalist view,
suggesting that general concerns of federalism cannot hamper the
ability of a modern, unified nation to act in the international
community, because the Constitution must respond to the
experiences of the nation.67 Holmes, a veteran of the Civil War,
invoked that crisis in his opinion:
It was enough for [the States] to realize or to hope that they had
created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a

the compatibility of treaties with their constitutional orders before concluding them, because any
errors are almost certainly not a basis for extricating themselves afterward.” Id. at 456.
62. Bandes, supra note 32, at 748–49.
63. HENKIN, supra note 57; Bradley, supra note 3, at 412; Golove, supra note 5, at 1098–99,
1296–97.
64. Golove, supra note 5, at 1098.
65. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
66. Id. at 432.
67. See id. at 433–34.
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nation. . . . The treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only
question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must
consider what this country has become in deciding what that
Amendment has reserved.68

Trumpeting Holland, Treaty Power nationalists contend that
unwritten portions of the Constitution, like structural federalism,
have no bearing on the responsibilities of the United States to keep
its promises in the international community69—federalism is merely
an “invisible radiation” of the Tenth Amendment.70
By concentrating on the Tenth Amendment and ignoring the
explicit “prohibitory words” of the Eleventh Amendment,71 this
doctrinal argument cleverly avoids federalism as a constitutional
restriction on the Treaty Power. It is clear under Reid v. Covert that
the national government may not use the Treaty Power to
circumvent explicit constitutional prohibitions.72 For example, a
treaty may not raise revenue, because only the House of
Representatives may propose laws raising revenue.73 In Reid, the
Court reversed the conviction of a non-military U.S. citizen tried by a
U.S. military court in Britain acting without a jury pursuant to an
executive agreement.74 That action violated the defendant’s

68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Swaine, supra note 61, at 449.
70. Golove, supra note 5, at 1257–66. The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
71. Or by adopting a “diversity” theory of the Eleventh Amendment (i.e., the Eleventh
Amendment was not meant to address federal question jurisdiction, but merely diversity
jurisdiction.). See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989).
72. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17; CORWIN, supra note 55, at 10; Golove, supra note 5, at 1084, 1097.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; HENKIN, supra note 57, at 203.
74. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
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constitutional right to trial by jury under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.75
But, even if the “invisible radiation” of federalism found in the
Tenth Amendment—and the rest of the Constitution’s structure—
does not trigger barriers to treatymaking, as Reid and Holland appear
to hold,76 federalism as articulated in the words of the Eleventh
Amendment should. If the explicitness tests of Missouri and Reid
determine what is and is not a barrier to treatymaking, the Eleventh
Amendment clearly constitutes a visible radiation of federalism—its
text represents such “prohibitory words” that explicitly enunciate
federalism as a barrier to treatymaking, at least concerning state
liability to out-of-state plaintiffs in federal court.
2. The Federalist Position
The most recent round of debate surrounding the Treaty Power’s
relationship to federalism began with Bradley’s articles critiquing the
nationalist view.77 Bradley contends that “if federalism is to be the
subject of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears
to believe—there is no justification for giving the treaty power special
immunity from such protection.”78 Bradley’s conception of
federalism deals with the implicit structure and history of the
Constitution and Tenth Amendment as well as current
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment.79

75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 18 (“There is nothing in Missouri v. Holland which is contrary to the position taken
here. There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsistent with any
specific provision of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted).
77. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3.
78. Bradley, supra note 3, at 394.
79. Id. at 434–50.
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Treaty Power federalists contend that the implicit constitutional
restriction of federalism must limit the Treaty Power just as express
provisions, such as the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, do.80 In Bradley’s
words:
[This would] subject the treaty power to the same federalism
restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers. Under the
approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional
regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to
bind the United States on the international plane. Thus, for
example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined
by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers,
such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez,
Boerne, and Printz decisions.81

In other words, Treaty Power federalists would overturn Missouri v.
Holland and reify the “invisible radiations” of the Tenth Amendment
and the implicit, yet obvious, federal structure of the Constitution.82
Bradley makes his argument through four discrete historical
observations on the balance of federalism established in the
Framing.83 First, the Framers wanted treaties to be procedurally
difficult to make.84 Bradley argues that the heightened procedural
steps required of treatymaking over ordinary legislation do not
authorize Congress to overreach its legislative authority, but rather
reflect ordained federalist barriers to national governmental power.85
He contends that a federalist view of the Treaty Power would not
80. Golove, supra note 5, at 1277 (discussing Justice Black’s opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957)).
81. Bradley, supra note 3, at 456. This is essentially the same thing that Senator Bricker
attempted to do by constitutional amendment. Golove, supra note 5, at 1311–12; see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
82. Bradley, supra note 3, at 458; Carlos Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1999).
83. Bradley, supra note 3, at 417.
84. Id. at 410–12.
85. Id. at 434–50.
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prevent the nation from speaking in a single voice—that voice would
just be different, accounting for every state’s input, and not raised as
often.86 Second, the Framers meant treaties to govern only truly
international relations—war, peace, and commerce. According to
Bradley, treaties may not govern domestic affairs because allowing
treaties to do so would provide a route for the national government
to take sovereignty from the states.87 Bradley’s account contains a
thorough history of subject matter limitations for treaties, starting
with the Framers and continuing through the proclamations of
Charles Evans Hughes to today.88 Third, the Framers chose only the
Senate, not Congress as a whole, to consent to treaties because of its
representation of state interests, not necessarily national, popular
interests.89 Under Bradley’s theory, the states could protect
themselves in the Senate under the Constitution primarily because
state legislatures elected U.S. Senators.90 Finally, the Framers gave
only limited powers to the national government in the Constitution,
reserving the rest for the states.91 James Madison made such a
concept, implicit in the Constitution itself, explicit in The Federalist
Papers.92
This is a remarkable argument for what it leaves out. Though
Bradley relies on some Eleventh Amendment doctrinal principles in
constructing his argument,93 he casts these arguments only as
86. Id.
87. Id. at 410–12.
88. Id. at 413–14, 429.
89. Id. at 412.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 283 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 2003) (“The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
93. Bradley, supra note 3, at 458 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)).
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indicators of the Court’s evolving jurisprudence in the area of state
sovereign immunity.94 Instead of discussing the history of the Treaty
Power as originally framed in the Constitution or by the Tenth
Amendment, Bradley could have relied on the history of the Treaty
Power as redefined by the Eleventh Amendment. As evident from its
history, the Eleventh Amendment contains specific prohibitory
words that delimit the Treaty Power and support Bradley’s argument.
III
THE FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
At first blush, the text of the Eleventh Amendment seems simple
enough: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Yet the
Eleventh Amendment is unusual among constitutional provisions
because of the way the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it.
According to many scholars and judges, the Eleventh Amendment’s
text does not control the jurisprudence of the principles it
expresses.95 Rather, according to a majority of the Court, state
sovereign immunity, which the Eleventh Amendment only partially
expresses, affords protections to states beyond the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. For example, these state sovereign immunity
protections include prohibitions on suits against states filed by instate plaintiffs.96 Conversely, the Eleventh Amendment does not

94. Bradley, supra note 4, at 118.
95. See Blatchford v. Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890); Mitchell N. Berman, et
al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix” Florida
Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2001).
96. Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.

H 237 I

04__SCHWAIGER.DOC

VOL. 2

11/1/2007 3:54:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2007

protect state officers from suits in equity even though the state can
accomplish nothing except through human agents.97 This hodgepodge jurisprudence has accreted over a century since the Court first
disregarded the history of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of
political expediency in Hans v. Louisiana.98 In Hans, the Court
“transformed the Eleventh Amendment from a specific, ordinary,
and written part of the Constitution into a paratextual loophole that
allowed [the Court] to infuse into the supreme law a ‘principle’ of
state sovereign immunity that was textually unmentioned and
therefore amorphous, highly elastic, and manipulable at will.”99 Since
Hans, the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment has never been
simple.
The apparent malleability of the Eleventh Amendment’s text is
remarkable because Congress chose its words carefully. Although a
resolution to amend the Constitution was initially introduced in
February 1793, just days after the Court issued Chisholm on February
18, 1793,100 Congress chose not to act on it for almost a year. The
resolution was reintroduced on January 2, 1794, tabled, and then
considered in tandem with several other potential constitutional
amendments.101 Congress discussed changes to the proposed
amendment, including making it purely prospective, a suggestion
that was defeated.102 On January 14, 1794, the Senate explicitly
considered whether claims arising under treaties should be
97. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908).
98. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on
Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1933–34 (2003) (discussing the
three major reasons why Hans should have no precedential value).
99. Id. at 1937.
100. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296.
101. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794).
102. Id. at 30–31. This suggestion, like the proposal by Albert Gallatin, which is discussed
below, would have allowed claims to be brought against the states under the Treaty of Peace.
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exempted.103 Senator Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania sought to
amend the resolution to read as follows:
The Judicial Power of the United States, except in cases arising
under treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.104

The Senate rejected Gallatin’s proposed exceptional language.105 But
why? The Eleventh Amendment is widely considered to have been
enacted solely in direct response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling
on state liability to American out-of-state creditors in Chisholm.106
According to this popular account, the Eleventh Amendment was
purely designed to save states money during a time of great debt.107
But if the Eleventh Amendment was meant merely to protect states
against suits by American out-of-state citizens seeking payment for
debts incurred during the Revolutionary War, why did Congress not
exclude treaty-based claims from those barred by the proposed
Eleventh Amendment?
103. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1932–33 (1983).
104. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794) (emphasis added). The fact that this language was
considered and rejected has been considered by the Court in dicta. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 735 (1999). Gallatin here is clearly referring to the Treaty of Peace, as indicated by his
invocation of “treaties made under the authority of the U.S.,” language that parallels the
supremacy clause’s recognition of the supreme nature of the Treaty of Peace. See U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 1, cl. 2.
105. Only Senators Gallatin and Rutherfurd of New Jersey voted for Gallatin’s amendment to
the resolution. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 31 (1794). Of the state legislatures that considered the
Eleventh Amendment, only Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the home states of Senators Gallatin
and Rutherfurd, refused to ratify it. WARREN, supra note 12, at 101.
106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See, e.g., NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA, 1760–
1815, at 339 (2d ed. 2002); STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; WARREN, supra note 12, at 96 (discussing
the “profound shock” theory of the Eleventh Amendment); Berman, supra note 95, at 1045;
Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 526–27; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1045.
107. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987).
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Judge John Gibbons has attempted to square the rejection of
Gallatin’s amendment with Gibbons’ understanding of the Eleventh
Amendment by contending that Gallatin’s language was merely
redundant and unnecessarily controversial and that Congress
actually sought to preserve treaty-based claims.108 As discussed
below, it is unrealistic to argue that U.S. Senators of the Federalist Era
would see the potential redundancy of Gallatin’s amendment as a
reason to reject it. It is more likely that the Senate rejected Gallatin’s
amendment because Senators sought to prevent British creditors
from bringing claims under the Treaty of Peace. After all, Chisholm
had spurred British creditors to file numerous claims in federal
courts.109 Moreover, the state ratification debates over the Eleventh
Amendment occurred during an Anglo-American war crisis. This
encouraged both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists alike in
Congress and state legislatures to ride a wave of anti-British feeling
by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment. In contrast, Federalist figures
in the national government’s executive and judiciary sought to ease
Anglo-American tensions through the immensely unpopular and
unpopulist Jay Treaty by dealing with the claims of British creditors
without relying on the states. In this way, the failures of the Treaty of
Peace spawned both the Eleventh Amendment and the Jay Treaty.110
To get a complete picture of federalism and the Treaty Power,
scholars should consider the close ties between the Treaty Power and
the Eleventh Amendment.

108. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1934–36; Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment,
and Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
605, 620–21 (2001). Gibbons asserts, “The Gallatin proposal . . . was not needed, since the
Eleventh Amendment in its final form excluded from federal courts only suits against states where
jurisdiction was based exclusively on Article III’s grant of party-status jurisdiction.” Gibbons,
supra note 103, at 1936 (emphasis added).
109. See WARREN, supra note 12, at 99.
110. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899.
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A. Revolutionary War Debt and the Treaty of Peace
Treaty Power scholars argue over the Framers’ intent in crafting
the Treaty Power. But the basis of the Framers’ understanding of the
Treaty Power—the Treaty of Peace—grew out of a Revolution over a
decade old at the time of the Framing. Treaty Power scholars should
consider the causes and results of the Treaty of Peace in determining
the original and subsequent meanings of the Treaty Power.
The role of debt in spurring the American Revolution is welldocumented.111 Before the Revolution, the British Parliament passed
several acts, among them the Navigation and Currency Acts, to
solidify Britain’s grip on trade with the colonies and collect on the
colonists’ debt to the Crown for protection during the Seven Years
War and Pontiac’s Rebellion.112 These acts limited colonial trade and
greatly increased deficits in the colonies.113 The amount of colonial
debt owed to British mercantile firms grew wildly in the last ten years
before the Revolution.114 In response to increasing trade problems,
colonists retaliated against Britain commercially—Virginia’s courts
even closed their doors to prevent the debt hearings that British
creditors sought.115 In quick succession, commercial retaliation gave
way to military retaliation.
Debt—this time owed domestically and to countries beside
Britain—continued to play an important role in American politics
during and after the Revolutionary War. According to James

111. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999).
112. Id. at 51.
113. Id.
114. Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of
the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1434 (1989).
115. HOLTON, supra note 111, at 126.
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Ferguson, “The war for independence . . . gave birth to Congressional
functions requiring money expenditures and, most important,
created a large domestic and foreign debt.”116 In addition to paying
expenditures, Congress authorized the impressment of goods and
services during the war.117 These widespread impressments further
indebted Congress to many creditors, especially in states like New
York that hosted a great deal of military activity.118 During the war,
many states paid soldiers when Congress could not afford it and
impressed both domestic- and foreign-owned goods for military
use.119
In the aftermath of the war, the states with the heaviest domestic
debts, like Massachusetts and South Carolina, wanted Congress to
assume their war debts.120 The political twists and turns of domestic
state debt assumption caused fluctuations in the debt speculation
markets centered in New York City.121 Of the many categories of
Revolutionary War debt, domestic state debt was the best for
speculation.122 Many domestic debts sold for pennies on the dollar
and before long were concentrated in the hands of relatively few

116. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE, 1776–1790, at xv (1961). Congress funded much of the war using loans, and by 1783,
owed about $11 million in loan certificates to specific wealthy creditors of Congress, $17 million
in final settlement certificates to soldiers and civilian creditors, and $13 million in certificates of
accrued interest. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 137–38 (1993).
117. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 58.
118. Id. at 59.
119. Id. at 180; FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 50–51
(1974). Several states, including Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, also authorized
impressments. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 59–61.
120. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 147. South Carolina was an exception to the
pattern of lessened debt in the South. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 212.
121. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 256–58.
122. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138; FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 270.
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investors.123 Concentration was especially high for state debts.124
According to Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, “Seventy-two
percent of the North Carolina debt, for example, was held by a group
small enough to have met in one room.”125 National assumption of
state debts would dramatically improve the value of these debts.126 As
part of the nationalization process, the national government would
collect from debtor states and pay creditor states for their expenses
during the Revolutionary War.127 This move was politically popular,
because each state thought it would be a creditor when the national
government settled the accounts.128
On the whole, the Revolutionary War debts that the states owed
to domestic creditors were not large or frightening, especially given
the economic growth of the 1780s.129 On June 29, 1793, the final
settlement of the state accounts for the Revolutionary War was
completed.130 Only New York owed a substantial sum—just over $2
million.131 The other states were either creditors or debtors owing
anywhere from $100,000 to $612,000.132 By 1794, the national
government had assumed most state debts, which at the time
constituted over $18 million.133 At that point, the states altogether

123. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138 (“$12.3 million in Continental securities for
which there are specific records was held by 3,300 individuals, 100 of them holding $5 million of
it, and another 170 holding $2.6 million more. In state debts the concentration was even more
striking.”); FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 251, 273 (discussing the example of Massachusetts).
124. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138.
125. Id.
126. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 207–17.
127. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 120–21.
128. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 212; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 97.
129. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 394 (1998).
130. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 332–33.
131. Id. at 333.
132. Id. Massachusetts, the largest creditor, owed $1,248,000. Id.
133. CLYDE JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 69 (1972).
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retained only about $8 million in domestic debt from the
Revolutionary War.134 Hamilton projected that amount would be cut
in half by the end of 1795.135
In addition to drawing upon patriotic resources, states seized the
estates of Loyalists and passed laws forcibly transferring debts owed
to British creditors to state-controlled loan offices.136 By doing so,
states began to collect on debt contractually owed to British
merchants.137 Jay, Franklin, and Adams used these recovered debts as
a significant bargaining chip when they negotiated the end of AngloAmerican hostilities in 1782.138 Although it is impossible to know
how much value the potential claims had when the negotiations
occurred, they were sizeable; even at the outset of the war, American
debtors had owed at least $28 million to British creditors.139

134. Id.
135. James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1350 (1998).
136. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899–1901; Golove, supra note 5, at 1151.
137. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01. Britain was primarily concerned with impediments
to debt collection in Virginia. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200. According to Egerton Ryerson:
[H]ad Virginia especially been honest enough to have permitted the payment of debts
which her people owed to British subjects before the war, the first years of our freedom
would not have been stained with a breach of our public faith, and the long and angry
controversy with Great Britain, which well-nigh involved us in a second war with her,
might not have occurred.
2 EGERTON RYERSON, THE LOYALISTS OF AMERICA AND THEIR TIMES: FROM 1620 TO 1816, at 142
(1880). State juries and judges additionally reduced interest on pre-war debts and discharged
debts of creditors that did not file timely, even though courts could not notify British creditors.
Holt, supra note 114, at 1439.
138. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899.
139. Id. at 1900–01. In Hamilton’s 1790 report to Congress, he thought the state debts to
British creditors would cost the national government around $25 million. MCDONALD, supra
note 119, at 58–59. When a mixed commission finally dealt with the claims in 1802, the U.S.
government paid out only just over $2.6 million to British creditors, a number far less than the
potential value of the claims in 1783. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 110 (5th ed. 1965).
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To construct a lasting peace, Jay, Franklin, and Adams demanded
the removal of British troops in the Northwest and American
ports.140 In exchange for the evacuation of troops, the Americans
guaranteed in the Treaty of Peace that “creditors on either side, shall
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value of
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted,”141 and
that Congress would suggest, but not require, state governments to
make restitution for property seized from Loyalists.142 Not even the
British believed that the most important states would actually follow
Congress’s recommendation to return seized property to Loyalists.143
Indeed, while South Carolina quickly moved to strike names off of
the list of the banished and returned property to Loyalists, New York,
Massachusetts, and Virginia were “neither merciful nor just.”144 More
importantly, when Congress turned out to be incapable of making
states open their courts to British creditors, the British kept their
posts.145

140. STAHR, supra note 2, at 100.
141. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, July 16, 1782, 8 Stat. 80. Jay dutifully explained to
Congress, which largely despised the idea of paying British merchants, that it needed to pay to
secure evacuation of the posts. STAHR, supra note 2, at 176.
142. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01. Jay drafted these requirements and
recommendations. STAHR, supra note 2, at 165, 297. Jay also drafted the treaty provisions to allow
British merchants, but not American Loyalists, to seek compensation for debts incurred before
the war. Id. at 165. Article IV of the Treaty of Peace dealt with British creditors. Article V dealt
with American Loyalists. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, art. IV–V. Ultimately, Britain would
pay many of the Loyalists’ claims but not those who had claims under the Treaty. See 2 RYERSON,
supra note 137, at 174.
143. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 235
(Greenwood Press 1983) (1935); BEMIS, supra note 139, at 59, 72; COMBS, supra note 44, at 4.
Parliament recognized this implicitly by appropriating money to give relief to Loyalists. BEMIS,
supra note 139, at 72.
144. 2 RYERSON, supra note 137, at 141–42; see also CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE, THE
LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 295–96 (2004) (describing the persecution of Tories in
New York State).
145. COMBS, supra note 44, at 11–13; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. The
British kept their posts to maintain their fur trade in the region by protecting traders and Indian
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British creditors turned to the federal courts. In the years
following ratification of the Treaty of Peace, British creditors filed
many suits against states.146 This put many states at substantial risk
from British merchants seeking sequestered property and from
American debtors who had paid their debts to the state loan offices
instead of British merchants.147 Given the lingering hostilities
between the United States and Britain, coupled with the amount of
the claims against U.S. debtors, many Americans despised the idea of
paying British creditors. Many states kept their statutory
impediments to British debt collection or even enacted further
ones.148 The already difficult situation for American debtors was so
bad in the southern states that they considered leaving the Union
rather than fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty of Peace and
subsidizing security for northern states.149
On the whole, the domestic state debts were not serious.150 In
comparison, American debts to British creditors loomed large.
Treaty Power scholars should consider that treaty-based claims in the
Federalist Era represented the largest and most bitter-tasting debt.
Valued at $28 million at the beginning of the war, debts to British

hunters. COMBS, supra note 44, at 11–12, 91; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. At the
time, furs were extraordinarily profitable. Id.
146. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99.
147. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1903. The financial burden would not be small. See BEMIS,
supra note 139, at 110; Fletcher, supra note 71, 1273 (“Claims against the states under the treaty
involved enormous amounts of money, sought by loyalists and British subjects, at a time when
political tension with Britain was high.”).
148. STAHR, supra note 2, at 202–04. The situation was particularly bad in Virginia—its
debtors owed more to British creditors than the debtors of any other state. COMBS, supra note 44,
at 83; STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. While most states eventually began allowing suits by British
plaintiffs, Virginia held firm, and neither federal nor state courts there offered help to British
creditors. STAHR, supra note 2, at 297. Between 1790 and Chisholm, British creditors filed over
one hundred cases against debtors in Virginia federal court. Id.
149. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1924.
150. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 336.
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creditors with interest were nearly four times greater than the $8
million in domestic state debts that existed before the Eleventh
Amendment ratification process began.
B. The Meaning of Chisholm
Several of the Court’s earliest cases dealt with state debts to
domestic and foreign individuals,151 but the case that most directly
and quickly pitted the Court against a state after the Framing was
Chisholm.152 Chisholm spurred the Eleventh Amendment’s
ratification, as virtually all scholars agree, but it did so in large part
because of its relevance to British creditors. Once Treaty Power
scholars consider this aspect of Chisholm, they can better evaluate the
importance of the Eleventh Amendment to their debate.
South Carolinian Robert Farquahar had provided materials to
Georgia during the Revolutionary War, but Georgia refused to pay
for them.153 After Farquahar died, his executor, another South
Carolinian, Alexander Chisholm, sued Georgia to recover the money
owed.154 Chisholm initially sued in lower federal court but later

151. Indeed, the very first case docketed in the U.S. Supreme Court, Vanstaphorst v.
Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791), dealt with state debt to individual citizens. JACOBS, supra
note 133, at 43. John Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was selected by Maryland in that case
to serve as an arbiter and did not recuse himself from presiding over the case. 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 14, 18
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. These debt cases were not traditional debt
collection cases. In one set of cases—Vanstaphorst, 2 U.S. 401, Cutting v. South Carolina, (U.S.
1797) in JACOBS, supra note 133, at 62–63, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)—
states did not refuse to pay because of insolvency but because of irregularities or lack of proof of
the underlying debt. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70. In some of these cases, states ultimately paid
the debt even after it became apparent that the Eleventh Amendment would protect the states. Id.
In another set of cases—Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), Moultrie v. Georgia, (U.S.
1797) in JACOBS, supra note 133, at 63, and Vassall v. Massachusetts, (U.S. 1793) in JACOBS, supra
note 133, at 62—states were impleaded, not directly sued. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70. None of
the cases concerned state paper, securities, or loan certificates issued by a state. Id.
152. 2 U.S. 419.
153. ORTH, supra note 107, at 12.
154. Id.
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brought the claim in the U.S. Supreme Court under its original
jurisdiction.155 Chisholm was represented by Edmund Randolph, the
U.S. Attorney General, in his personal capacity.156 Despite not facing
an opponent, Randolph engaged the Court with the fundamental
questions that the case presented. He acknowledged that Chisholm’s
position was unpopular and attempted to defuse populist paranoia
over the erosion of state power by saying that “the prostration of
State-rights is no object to me,” and that states “need not fear an
assault from bold ambition.”157
Georgia did not enter an appearance—it denied the right of the
Court to hear the case.158 The Court ruled in Chisholm’s favor, with
only Justice Iredell dissenting.159 Each of the four concurring seriatim
opinions concluded that the Constitution authorized the Court’s
jurisdiction over suits against states filed by out-of-state citizens.160
Of the Chisholm opinions, Chief Justice Jay’s opinion especially made
the states begin to fear their obligations under the Treaty of Peace,
because Jay loudly promoted a powerful national government,161 and
he had chosen to be on the Supreme Court instead of in
Washington’s cabinet to do so.162 In addition to its controversial

155. Id. at 12–13.
156. Id. at 13.
157. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 132, 134.
158. ORTH, supra note 107, at 13.
159. Iredell called the question differently based on his belief that a citizen could not bring
such a suit against the government under British common law. Id. at 13–14.
160. ORTH, supra note 107, at 14–15.
161. STAHR, supra note 2, at 90; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at 14
(“[T]he national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious, than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as
more safe with respect to us.”). Iredell also agreed that the judicial power of the United States
covered issues arising out of treaties. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793).
162. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 38. In fact, Jay’s main purpose in sitting on the Supreme
Court bench was to enforce the Treaty of Peace. According to Jay biographer Walter Stahr,
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content, Jay’s opinion was the only opinion published in a
newspaper.163 According to Jay’s opinion:
[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of
the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; and it was
their interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws
should be respected and obeyed; in their national character and
capacity, the United States were responsible to foreign nations for
the conduct of each State, relative to the laws of nations, and the
performance of treaties; and there the inexpediency of referring all
such questions to State Courts, and particularly to the Courts of
delinquent States became apparent.164

Even though the plaintiff in Chisholm did not invoke a treaty-based
right and Congress had failed to provide the Court with federal
question jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Justices,

Jay was interested in being Chief Justice . . . because he expected the new federal courts
to handle important issues, especially international issues. The state courts were still not
allowing British creditors to recover from American debtors. Jay feared that, if the
United States did not honor this critical provision of the peace treaty, Britain would not
honor the provision requiring it to evacuate the forts, and some frontier incident would
lead to a war. From his perspective, therefore, the most pressing problem facing the new
federal courts was to enforce British debts, and thus prevent a second war.
STAHR, supra note 2, at 272. Jay had already sought to use lower federal courts to enforce the
treaty that he had negotiated. When riding circuit in Connecticut, Jay struck down a state statute
he held to be inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace. Id. at 281 & n.25. Jay similarly had struck
down a state statute in Rhode Island under the Contracts Clause. Id. at 291 & n.52. After
Chisholm, Jay continued to use the courts to remedy wrongs enacted against British creditors. Id.
at 297–300; 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 159–60 (2d ed. 2002). Ultimately, the U.S.
Supreme Court, without Jay, would uphold Jay’s decisions in these cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 242–43, 245 (1796) (holding that Article IV of the Treaty of Peace nullified a
Virginia law impeding payment to British creditors). Jay was able to avoid criticism after
Chisholm in other cases involving states by having a jury decide legal matters under his guidance
rather than issuing a written opinion himself. STAHR, supra note 2, at 309. In these cases, Jay was
only partially able to assuage British concerns with the way that debts were treated in the United
States. Id. at 312.
163. A Citizen of the United States, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 151, at 232 n.1. Jay’s opinion appeared in the Federalist paper, GAZETTE OF THE
UNITED STATES, in August 1793. Id.
164. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474 (second emphasis added).
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especially Chief Justice Jay, focused on such questions.165 In his
opinion in Chisholm, Jay grabbed for further national government
power by relying on the Constitution, not the Judiciary Act of 1789,
for jurisdiction.166 Because three other justices also made this point,
Chisholm formed the precedent that the Court had constitutional,
not statutory, jurisdiction over treaty-based claims.
Chisholm, and especially Jay’s opinion, threatened the legitimacy
of state laws protecting American debtors against British creditors.167

165. After all, Jay had been responsible for cataloguing the problems associated with
fulfillment of state obligations under the Treaty of Peace. ORTH, supra note 107, at 16–17; 1
UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 162, at 157; see supra Part II.A. Since at least October 1786,
Jay had espoused a strongly nationalistic view of the Treaty Power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203.
According to Jay, states could only participate in the treatymaking process through their
representatives in the national government, and, once the national government ratified a treaty,
“it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and super-added to the laws of the land,
without the intervention, consent or fiat of state legislatures.” Jay Report, supra note 47, at 334.
This vision of national supremacy was espoused by Randolph in oral argument in Chisholm as a
way of preserving international peace and reiterated by Jay in his opinion. JACOBS, supra note 133,
at 49. The year after his report, many of Jay’s Federalist friends incorporated Jay’s ideas into key
clauses of the Constitution, including the bar on state treaties, the Supremacy Clause, and the text
and structure of the Treaty Power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 206.
166. Years earlier, Jay had given a specific justification for the Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction in cases arising out of treaties:
Because under the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the
laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same
manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or
in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that as well
from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and
independent Governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may
affect and influence them. The wisdom of the Convention in committing such questions
to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one
national Government, cannot be too much commended. . . . The case of the treaty of
peace with Britain, adds great weight to this reasoning.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at 14.
167. Many Americans were particularly nervous that the courts would force them to pay the
British claims, because Jay had previously publicly stated that the confiscation of British debts was
illegal and that the Americans had violated the Treaty of Peace as much as the British had. ELKINS
& MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 395; see also STAHR, supra note 2, at 203–05 (discussing Jay’s
belief that some state laws had violated the Treaty of Peace and had even preceded British
violations of the Treaty). Part of this sentiment likely arose from the fact that Jay’s father, Peter
Jay, had been an agent for British merchants and had earned his money by collecting debt for
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The decision, though protecting a patriot of the American
Revolution, set the precedent that the opponents of the Revolution
could sue states. Among the populace, this generated widespread fear
and anger that state treasuries were vulnerable to litigation by British
creditors, Tories, and Loyalists.168 State treasuries faced a large loss
from these claims.169 Some congressional delegates responded right
away to this fear. Within days after the Court announced Chisholm,
Massachusetts Representative Theodore Sedgwick introduced a
resolution in the House for a constitutional amendment that would
bar suits against states in federal court by any person.170 The next day,
Massachusetts Senator Caleb Strong introduced a similar resolution
in the U.S. Senate barring suits against a state by citizens of another

British merchants. STAHR, supra note 2, at 5. In addition, Jay’s law practice in New York City had
consisted primarily of commercial debt actions. Id. at 29.
168. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. According to Warren,
Although opposition to the Court’s decision was to some extent based on divergencies
of political theories as to State sovereignty, the real source of attack on the Chisholm
Case was the very concrete fear of the ‘numerous prosecutions that will immediately
issue from the various claims of refugees, Tories, etc., that will introduce such a series of
litigation as will throw every State in the Union in the greatest confusion.’
Id. at 99; see also Pfander, supra note 135, at 1278 (arguing that the “shock” resulting from
Chisholm stemmed from a fear that states would be required to honor old debts).
169. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01 (stating that, immediately prior to the War,
American debts to British merchants totaled about $28 million).
170. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61, 597. This resolution
read:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts,
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the
suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners,
of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser 1, col 2 (Feb 27, 1793) reprinted in Fletcher, supra
note 71, at 1269 & n.45. Congress could have later adopted this type of blanket amendment, but
instead used words that only explicitly circumscribe the ability of only out-of-state plaintiffs to
sue states in law or equity, probably in reaction to Chisholm’s legal action in assumpsit and
Vassall’s equitable claim. See “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III,
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Feb. 6, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 253,
256; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365.
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state or a foreign state.171 State legislatures began inquiring into their
state liabilities and evaluating the potentially dire state consequences
of Chisholm.172 But reaction to Chisholm was not unanimous; rather,
ultra-federalists loudly supported the decision, and even mainstream
Federalist newspapers like the Connecticut Courrant and the Gazette
of the United States responded to Chisholm favorably.173 Generally,
reaction to Chisholm was partisan, with Federalists supporting the
decision and Democratic-Republicans opposing it.174 In Congress,
both resolutions were tabled, and Congress adjourned without taking
further action.175 Chisholm had no immediate legislative impact.176
Chisholm encouraged Tories and Loyalists to file and press suits,
especially against states such as South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia,
and Massachusetts.177 The most important of these cases was Vassall

171. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61, 597.
172. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365.
173. John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1435 (1975); see also A Citizen of the United States, supra note 163, at 232 (“For my
own part, I have never yet heard a good reason assigned, why a fraudulent state should not be
amenable to justice, as well as a fraudulent individual! for such we know there are.”).
174. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1434. State sovereign immunity was a contentious issue, not
only between states, but within many states. For example, the strange and shifting responses of
New York to a contract suit filed by Eleazer Oswald arose from political contests within the state
legislature over potential instructions to the state attorney general. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at
62–64. Even in Georgia, whose House passed legislation making it a capital offense to attempt to
enforce Chisholm, political actors were not unanimous—the state Senate failed to act on the
House’s frightening legislation. Id. at 135. Similarly, newspapers published tracts both for and
against state sovereign immunity and its implications for foreign plaintiffs in Massachusetts. See
generally 5 DHSC, supra, at 389–424 (presenting myriad articles that argue the merits and
shortcomings of sovereign immunity relative to the plaintiff’s demand for payment from the state
in Vassall v. Massachusetts).
175. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1059. Vassall believed, perhaps correctly, that the Eleventh
Amendment was created to defeat his claim against the state of Massachusetts. 5 DHSC, supra
note 151, at 369.
176. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 597.
177. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. These states, with federal constitutional and treaty-based
claims mounting against them, were later particularly ardent supporters of the Eleventh
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v. Massachusetts.178 Vassall concerned Loyalist William Vassall, who
had left Massachusetts during the Revolutionary War, after which the
state seized his property.179 The state of Massachusetts auctioned off
Vassall’s furniture and mortgaged his home.180 After the United
States negotiated the Treaty of Peace with Britain, Massachusetts
passed a law in March 1784 allowing Loyalists to reclaim seized,
unmortgaged properties, but eight months later officially confiscated
all mortgaged properties.181 Vassall sued, claiming he had been
damaged by the state’s confiscation act, which Vassall claimed
contravened the prohibitions against future confiscations contained
in the Treaty of Peace.182
When the Court issued process in Vassall in June 1793 on
Massachusetts Governor John Hancock, the state legislature grappled
with how to respond.183 The problem was that the clear language of
the Treaty of Peace, which said “there shall be no future confiscations
made,” conflicted with the express purpose of the later Massachusetts
law confiscating Loyalist property.184 The legislature considered
making an appropriation to pay the debt or judgment, seeking an
Amendment. Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61, 114–15 (1989).
178. In fact, Vassall was probably the basis for the original resolutions proposing the terms
later adopted as the Eleventh Amendment. Massachusetts Representative Theodore Sedgwick and
Senator Caleb Strong, who likely introduced amendment resolutions directly after Chisholm,
might actually have responded to leaked news regarding the Court’s processing of Vassall, and not
to Chisholm. See 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61. Of course, the precedent of Chisholm gave
teeth to the Court’s proceedings in Vassall.
179. JACOBS, supra note 133 at 60; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 352–69.
180. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 354.
181. Id. at 355.
182. Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, art VI.
183. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 61. Not all states were as reactionary as Massachusetts or
Virginia. Despite the fact that New York’s state sovereignty was under threat from suit in Oswald,
the New York Assembly, against the recommendation of Governor George Clinton, refused to
pass resolutions similar to those of Massachusetts and Virginia. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 63.
184. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, at art. VI; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 355.
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advantageous construction of the judiciary article, or seeking to
amend the Constitution.185 But the patent, anti-British prejudice of
Massachusetts, expressed in newspapers and legislative committees,
prevented any real consideration by the Massachusetts legislature of
honoring claims by Loyalists or Tories.186 In the words of one
Massachusetts resident, “If [Vassall] should obtain what he has sued
for—what a wide extended door will it open for every DIRTY TORY,
TRAITOR to his countries liberties to enter.”187 Moreover,
Massachusetts would be unlikely to win a favorable interpretation of
the judiciary article, based on Chisholm.188 If U.S. Attorney General
Edmund Randolph, who represented Vassall just as he had
represented Chisholm, brought this case to the Chisholm Court,
headed by Federalist and Treaty of Peace negotiator Chief Justice Jay,
the Court would strike down the Massachusetts law as
unconstitutional, making the Treaty of Peace and its assurances for
Tories the supreme law of the United States.189

185. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 61.
186. See, e.g., Marcus, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), July 13, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 151, at 390 (“Let the freemen of Massachusetts but only hear, much more see, that the arm of
a tyrannical power is uplifted to strike a blow at their liberties. . . .”); but see Veritas, COLUMBIAN
CENTINAL (Boston), July 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra, at 390–91 (noting that the
principles underlying the decision of a former Massachusetts Chief Justice weigh “in favour of a
foreign citizen”).
187. Democrat, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), July 23, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 394; see
also The Crisis, No. XIII by “A Republican,” INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), July 25, 1793,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra, at 395 (“For should it be admitted that the States may be sued in the
Federal Judiciary, the numerous prosecutions that will immediately issue from the various claims
of refugees, tories, etc. will introduce such a series of litigation, as will throw every State in the
Union into the greatest confusion.”).
188. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 361–64.
189. Id. Randolph advised Vassall that the Court would affirm Chisholm and strike down the
Massachusetts law as contravening the Treaty of Peace. Id. at 364.
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The Massachusetts legislature ultimately decided to push for a
constitutional amendment barring court jurisdiction over the issue.190
The Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution urging
congressional action in September 1793191 and forwarded its
resolution to other state legislatures for their consideration.192
Connecticut passed a similar resolution a month later and was joined
by Virginia, South Carolina, and Maryland before the end of 1793.193
Several other states began moving to pass analogous resolutions,
including Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, before
being preempted by congressional action.194 At the beginning of
1794, the U.S. Senate again considered Senator Strong’s resolution to
amend the U.S. Constitution and, after giving itself two more weeks,
finally came to a vote on the resolution.195
The precedent of Chisholm threatened to turn the provisions of
the Treaty of Peace into enforceable claims.196 Although the states
could largely pay their debts because the national government had
already assumed most of them,197 citizens became enraged over the
course of the year after Chisholm that Americans might now have to
pay those who fought against the Revolution. The pursuit of claims
190. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 62. The state failed to appear before the Court and
continuances were repeatedly granted until 1797, when the case was dismissed. Id.
191. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1058. This resolution differed slightly from an earlier version
written in June 1793. Compare Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court,
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), June 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 230–
31 with Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, Sept. 27, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra,
at 440.
192. Id.
193. See generally 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 609–11.
194. See generally id. at 612–16.
195. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25–31 (1794).
196. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1358.
197. See JACOBS, supra note 133, at 69 (“[O]ver two-thirds of the debts of the states had been
assumed by the federal government, and the state governments, for the most part, were able and
willing to meet their obligations.”).
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like Vassall, based on the Chisholm precedent, pushed state
legislatures to suggest constitutional change in order to prevent
payouts to opponents of the Revolution. Thus, contrary to what
many scholars argue, the immediate political context of the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment was not the Court’s decision
in Chisholm protecting American patriots,198 but rather Chisholm’s
value as precedent to British creditors.
C. The War Crisis
The international context of 1793–95 compounded the already
mounting anger and fear over litigation by British creditors. It is
within this context that Treaty Power scholars should understand the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in order to gauge its
relevance to their debate. The Eleventh Amendment was an antiBritish act.199
Anti-British feelings were widespread throughout the United
States even before the war crisis.200 In April 1793, President
Washington first heard that France and Britain had committed to
war against each other.201 The United States proclaimed official
neutrality between France and Britain but continued to supply

198. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1358–59. Many scholars have emphasized American creditors
rather than British creditors. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 185 (2d ed. 2002) (claiming erroneously that Chisholm was decided in 1794 and
that Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment within three weeks of the decision); Marshall,
supra note 12, at 1378.
199. According to Clyde Jacobs:
[I]n Congress, as well as in the state legislatures, there was strong opposition to
recognition of any liability to reimburse British creditors or to make restitution for the
seizure of Loyalist property. In fact, this was the transcendent political issue of 1794 and
1795, when the Eleventh Amendment was under active consideration.
JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70–71.
200. See STAHR, supra note 2, at 200 (describing British violations of the peace treaty and
labeling Britain as “the main threat to American security” at this time).
201. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 95.
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French colonies in the West Indies.202 After all, France had been an
ally in revolution against monarchy, and the United States had
promised to protect French colonies in the Caribbean.203 But many
people in northern states, especially those exposed to the frontier,
wanted the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations so that Britain
would no longer have an excuse to maintain its military presence in
the Northwest.204 With British troops still in the Ohio River Valley,205
Pennsylvanians feared further Anglo-American hostilities or
incitement of Britain’s Indian allies.206 By the beginning of 1794,
when Congress considered the Eleventh Amendment resolution,
Congress was already primed to act on American ill-will toward
Britain.207
When it appeared that Congress would pass an amendment
erecting new barriers to fulfill promises made in the Treaty of Peace,
thus potentially endangering Americans on the frontier, it was
Senator Gallatin from Pennsylvania (a frontier state) who suggested

202. Id. at 96–97.
203. Id.
204. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. This desire
was voiced despite Britain’s already diminished military presence on the American frontier. After
France declared war on Britain, Britain essentially abandoned its posts on the North American
continent. According to Combs:
The whole of Britain’s North American colonies now contained a total of thirty-five
hundred regular troops, including those in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The
frontier posts were greatly undermanned. Detroit and Niagara had a few more than
three hundred men apiece guarding the walls, but Michilimachinack had only sixty-one,
Erie thirty-nine, and Ontario fifty-four. The fortifications themselves were in a ruinous
state.
COMBS, supra note 44, at 138.
205. ORTH, supra note 107, at 17.
206. This threat was vivid in the minds of many frontier Americans—on November 4, 1791,
Indians had routed St. Clair’s Army and chased them back to Fort Washington on the Ohio River.
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 271. In response, many American leaders called for the
British to quit their posts. Id.
207. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1438.
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the Eleventh Amendment not apply to claims arising under
treaties.208 To facilitate the removal of British troops from the
Northwest pursuant to the Treaty of Peace, Gallatin sought to
maintain the power of federal courts to enforce the Treaty of Peace
against the states.209 He failed. Widespread hostility toward British
creditors spurred passage of the resolution in the Senate without
Gallatin’s exception for treaty-based claims.210 A week before the
House voted on the resolution, word arrived that the British had
issued an order allowing the seizure of American ships carrying
goods from the French West Indies.211 The House, after some further
discussion and proposed amendments, passed the resolution
proposing the Eleventh Amendment to the states on March 4,
1794.212 Both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists in Congress
had overwhelmingly supported the Eleventh Amendment during a
spasm of anti-British hatred.
The uneasy peace between the United States and Britain
continued to erode as tensions ran high during the spring of 1794
over British troop placement in the Northwest and the British navy’s

208. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Gallatin was also concerned that a new
constitutional convention, an opportunity for French intrigue, would jeopardize the nation’s
future. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1935.
209. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 600; Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1933. Gallatin may also have
been concerned that, if the Eleventh Amendment was enacted, the national debt would further
increase as the national government stepped up to pay off the claims of foreign creditors of states.
Gallatin and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton viewed the national debt very
differently. Hamilton saw a national debt as an affirmative good because it could serve as liquid
capital that, if properly governed, would help develop the country and be a “national blessing.”
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116. Gallatin did not agree. SELECTED WRITINGS OF
ALBERT GALLATIN xxiv (E. James Ferguson ed. 1967); RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT
GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND DIPLOMAT 60 (1957).
210. ORTH, supra note 107, at 20.
211. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1439.
212. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1290–91.
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further interference with American-French trade in the Caribbean.213
By March 24, 1794, Washington received word that the British navy
had begun seizing American shipments and impressing American
sailors in the Caribbean.214 Within days, Washington also received
word that the longstanding tensions in the Northwest had come to a
head—Governor Lord Dorchester had exhorted Indians there to
prepare for war against the United States.215
These actions stoked the fires of anti-British fervor in the United
States, pushing the United States and Britain to the brink of war.216
They brought swift and nearly unanimous responses. DemocraticRepublicans and Federalists, who did not want to appear soft on
Britain, began to ratify the Eleventh Amendment in state
legislatures;217 Congress pushed forward embargoes and
sequestration bills.218 Two states, Rhode Island and New York,
ratified the Eleventh Amendment immediately after learning of the
British seizures and impressments.219 The British campaign also gave
rise to a month-long embargo against Britain starting at the end of
March.220 Weeks later, despite learning that Britain had established a
new, less aggressive order, the House Committee of the Whole
213. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 99–100; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 375;
MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 135–37 (discussing, inter alia, British arming of slave revolts and
allowing Barbary pirates to prey freely upon Americans as further reasons Americans despised
Britain).
214. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 388–391, STAHR, supra note 2, at 313.
215. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 392; STAHR, supra note 2, at 313; see BEMIS,
supra note 139, at 99–100; COMBS, supra note 44, at 91. Americans greatly feared a combined
British-Indian attack. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200.
216. Golove, supra note 5, at 1116.
217. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1439–40.
218. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 100.
219. See U.S. Constitution: Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments.html#f3 n.3 (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
220. COMBS, supra note 44, at 121.
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passed an additional bill banning commerce with Britain on April 15,
1794.221
Foreseeing a looming military and commercial crisis, Treasury
Secretary Hamilton implored President Washington to send Chief
Justice Jay to London to work out a new treaty.222 Because Federalists
were relatively powerful in the Senate and in the minority in the
House, a treaty dealing with the debts would be more likely to
succeed than mere legislation.223 On April 16, 1794, Washington
nominated Jay as a special envoy to try to take the air out of attempts
by Congress and the states to retaliate commercially against
Britain.224 In doing so, President Washington sought to soothe
relations by seeking a new treaty with Britain that did not rely on the
cooperation of individual states or the House.225
The American envoy had three major areas of complaint: (1) the
British military presence in the Northwest; (2) the expansion of the
definition of “contraband,” which resulted in increased seizures of
American shipments to French colonies; and (3) Britain’s refusal to
lower restrictions on American shipping to Britain.226 In the
negotiations, the payment of debts and the evacuation of the posts
were always connected, reciprocal obligations.227 Washington’s ploy

221. Id. at 122.
222. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 101. Jay had had extensive experience in foreign relations under
the Articles of Confederation and during the start of Washington’s administration. He was
Washington’s first pick for Secretary of State, but Washington granted his wish to be Chief Justice
instead. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 27, 38.
223. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 106–07 (discussing that Federalists generally had control
of the Senate, but not of the House, after the election of 1792).
224. COMBS, supra note 44, at 122.
225. Id. at 104; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 106–07, 141.
226. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 377; STAHR, supra note 2, at 317–18.
227. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 397. Even after negotiations, when the Senate
was determining whether to ratify, Alexander Hamilton continued to connect occupation of the
posts with the barriers states had erected to collection of British debts. See id. at 434–35.
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to use a special envoy to take the wind out of the sails of anti-British
hysteria largely worked in the House,228 but one after another, the
state legislatures continued to ratify the Eleventh Amendment.229 By
the time Jay returned with treaty terms, ten more states had ratified,
completing the procedural requirements outlined in the Constitution
for ratification of an amendment.230
The political test of the Jay Treaty did not reach Philadelphia
until March 7, 1795.231 The Jay Treaty guaranteed that the United
States would pay Britain for the bona fide debts contracted before the
Treaty of Peace.232 The Jay Treaty itself did not address the debts
owed to British creditors; that question was referred to a special
mixed commission established by the treaty.233 The Jay Treaty also
prohibited either the United States or Britain from supplying military
aid to Indians in the border area.234 The treaty required Americans to
exhaust their judicial remedies in Britain before referring their claims

228. COMBS, supra note 44, at 127, 135 (discussing how most congressional Anglo-American
legislation got sidetracked after the Eleventh Amendment went to ratification procedures and
Washington nominated Jay as an envoy); see, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 142–43.
229. See U.S. Constitution, supra note 219, at n.3.
230. These states were: Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794;
Massachusetts, June 16, 1794; Vermont, between October 9 and November 9, 1794; Virginia,
November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7, 1794; Maryland,
December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; and North Carolina, February 7, 1795. Id. at n.3.
The Eleventh Amendment was officially added to the Constitution on January 8, 1798, when
President Adams notified Congress that the required number of states had ratified the
amendment. Id.
231. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 417.
232. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116. [hereinafter Jay Treaty]; ORTH, supra note 107, at 17.
233. Jay Treaty, supra note 232, art. VI; BEMIS, supra note 139, at 101; ORTH, supra note 107,
at 17. Later, additional negotiations after the breakup of the commission resolved the debts.
ORTH, supra note 107, at 17. Ultimately, the Jay Treaty’s mixed commissions would break up,
only to have another mixed commission finally resolve the debts. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 110.
The U.S. government, not the states, paid $2,664,000 to British creditors. ORTH, supra note 107, at
17.
234. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 410.
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to a commission, even though British subjects who sought to bring
claims against Americans did not have to exhaust such remedies.235
Moreover, the Treaty prohibited the sequestration of British debts or
legislation discriminating against British merchants, by then a longstanding tradition in the United States.236
As expected in a highly anti-British environment, the terms of the
Jay Treaty were incredibly unpopular.237 Mobs burned Jay in effigy
and threw stones at Hamilton when he spoke out for the treaty.238
Americans generally believed Jay had paid too much for peace.239
Given its controversial provisions, the Jay Treaty required some
political maneuverings to achieve ratification. The Treaty barely
passed the Senate, with a vote of 20-10.240 Treaty opponents,
especially House Democratic-Republicans, sought to set up
constitutional barriers to the treaty by demanding an independent
House review of treaties requiring expenditures,241 but the
appropriations passed the House without the review by three votes.242
Britain abandoned its military posts in June 1796.243 Jay had saved the
nation in an hour of crisis.244

235. COMBS, supra note 44, at 152.
236. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 102; COMBS, supra note 44, at 152.
237. COMBS, supra note 44, at 151–52. The question remains to this day whether Jay got a
good deal. Id.
238. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103.
239. Certainly, Jay was told to be prepared to pay dearly because the Federalists were so
determined to avoid war, COMBS, supra note 44, at 133–34, but the threat of the Northwest posts
was virtually eliminated before Jay returned, and without his knowledge, MCDONALD, supra note
119, at 149.
240. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103.
241. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 357.
242. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 104.
243. COMBS, supra note 44, at 147. The British kept the posts until the treaty terms were
funded by the House. Id. at 180.
244. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103. Remarkably, in the end the Jay Treaty came to be almost
universally supported. COMBS, supra note 44, at 173.
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This crisis was not limited to the international arena. In fact, the
Jay Treaty also allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to evade addressing a
crucial and potentially destructive question.245 Ware v. Hylton,246
which dealt with treaty-based claims, was making its way to the
Court when the Jay Treaty established its mixed commissions.
Because the Jay Treaty established an alternative forum, the case
moved from the Court to the commission.247 Because Washington,
Hamilton, and Jay had moved deftly and swiftly to negotiate a new
treaty without the involvement of the states, the Court did not
directly face the contentious question of whether claims brought
under the Treaty of Peace were enforceable against the states.248 In
this way, while the Eleventh Amendment defused the Treaty of
Peace, the Jay Treaty defused the Eleventh Amendment.
D. Bipartisan Support among the States and Congress
Viewing the Eleventh Amendment in the political context of the
partisan conflicts over international and domestic debt highlights
how the Eleventh Amendment reaffirmed the vision of DemocraticRepublicans and cabined the Treaty Power.
During the war crisis, Americans generally shouted for the
fortification of ports, the increase of military spending, and the
sequestration of British debts.249 Federalists and DemocraticRepublicans reacted differently to the burgeoning war crisis.
Federalists tended to demand stronger defenses as a means to

245. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1940.
246. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
247. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1940.
248. There were some related cases in the Court and directly related cases in other courts,
however. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1949–56.
249. COMBS, supra note 44, at 121–25; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 405.
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peace.250 Although not prepared to declare war, DemocraticRepublicans were generally more hostile and pushed for commercial
retaliation.251 These different positions stemmed primarily from
different beliefs about how bad a war between the United States and
Britain would be—Federalists believed war would be much worse
than Democratic-Republicans believed.252 Hence, DemocraticRepublicans continued to antagonize British interests in state
legislatures and Congress.253 Many Federalists at the state level also
rode the anti-British wave, taking it to political victory in state
legislatures and in Congress.254 But the most powerful and politically
insulated Federalists at the national level—Washington, Jay, and
Hamilton—sought to reconcile differences with Britain, secure the
nation, and grow the national government through the Jay Treaty. As
the states rushed to ratify the Eleventh Amendment, Washington
rushed Chief Justice Jay to Britain to negotiate a new treaty. In sum,
in ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, Democratic-Republicans
reacted to the Treaty of Peace and Federalists relied on the
forthcoming Jay Treaty.
1. Democratic-Republicans: Ideology and Corruption
The Eleventh Amendment was a Democratic-Republican victory
over the vision of government that Washington and Jay espoused
both officially and personally. It particularly admonished John Jay as

250. COMBS, supra note 44, at 122.
251. STAHR, supra note 2, at 313–14. Leaders like Jefferson and Madison believed that Britain
would not be able to wage war against the United States because of the vast Atlantic Ocean, so
they were ready to antagonize the British more than their Federalists counterparts were. COMBS,
supra note 44, at 79.
252. COMBS, supra note 44, at 130.
253. Id. at 127.
254. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1440 (“A vote for the eleventh amendment was consistent
with the Federalists’ strategy of proving to the people that they were as anti-British as the
Democratic-Republicans.”).

H 264 I

04__SCHWAIGER.DOC

VOL. 2

11/1/2007 3:54:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2007

the negotiator of the Treaty of Peace, the most vocal proponent of an
expansive Treaty Power, and the author of the most frightening
Chisholm opinion.255 Chisholm reaffirmed the Federalist ideal,256 and
Democratic-Republicans fought that ideal through the processes
outlined in the Constitution.
Some Democratic-Republicans supported the Eleventh
Amendment for principled reasons,257 but state legislatures of the
time also had baser motivations such as graft, venality, and revenge.
Robert Morris, for example, believed that “state legislatures were
generally immune to all considerations of honor and sound policy.”
258
Under the Articles of Confederation, the popular assemblies in
many states wielded essentially supreme sovereign power, with all its
concomitant corruption and foolishness.259 In New York, after the
Framing, rumors abounded that state legislators were heavily
invested in state securities and preferred to pay themselves before
anyone else.260 Throughout the 1780s, the collapse of trust between
the populace and their representatives was a constant issue.261
Discrimination against out-of-state creditors was not beyond the
short-sighted and corrupt nature of many state legislatures after the
Framing. According to James Madison, state assembly members

255. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
256. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71.
257. For example, the essays of the “True Federalist” marshaled a fairly cohesive intellectual
rebuke of Chisholm. See, e.g., “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number I,
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Jan. 16, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 238,
238–43.
258. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 148. Conservatives generally had little faith in state
legislatures. Id. at 244.
259. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 10. Indeed, this may have been why state
legislatures were not trusted with ratification of the Constitution. See id. at 31.
260. See FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 231.
261. WOOD, supra note 129, at 368.
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easily lost sight of the community’s interest in favor of their own
constituencies’ immediate desires,262 even to the point of enacting
protectionist laws that greatly limited commerce between the
states.263 He was deeply concerned that states would commit fraud
against out-of-state creditors, thereby entangling the United States in
disputes with foreign powers or commercial interests.264 State
legislatures and state courts of the era were notoriously
protectionist—Congress had to encourage the states to honor out-ofstate debts, even if those debts were owed to sister states.265 In
ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, state legislatures might simply
have given lip service to Democratic-Republican virtues while
advancing less noble interests.
2. Federalists: The Jay Treaty and Growing National Power
Once Congress proposed the Eleventh Amendment in the midst
of a war crisis, the Amendment sailed through state ratification
procedures with widespread support from Federalists. This is
puzzling because Federalists generally considered payment of public
debt to be a sacred obligation.266 Moreover, there were many pro262. Id. at 195; see also id. at 406 (“‘The acts of almost every legislature,’ charged Judge
Alexander Hanson in 1784, ‘have uniformly tended to disgust its citizens, and to annihilate its
credit.’”); MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 69.
263. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 24 (discussing how states were “hemmed in by
the commercial regulations of neighbor states”).
264. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 14; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 11. Jay felt
similarly. See, e.g., STAHR, supra note 2, at 74; THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at
14. Indeed, this was one of the main motivations for creating a federal court system. Holt, supra
note 114, at 1458.
265. See FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 225; Holt, supra note 114, at 1456–57. This
protectionism was consistent with the mercantilist tendencies that were the hallmark of national
political economies of the time. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 20.
266. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 147; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 65 (discussing
Washington’s belief that debt repayment was a “crucial matter of honor”). According to
Ferguson, payment during peace, even of speculators who had paid much less than face value, was
important, even though states had steeply cut the debts during war time. FERGUSON, supra note
116, at 244.
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creditor Federalists in many state legislatures and the U.S. Congress
in the mid-1790s.267
Yet, because most state debts had already been taken care of by
this time,268 Federalists could support the Eleventh Amendment as a
shrewd political move to deprive opponents of a winning political
issue,269 keeping Democratic-Republicans out of office and
preventing a new constitutional convention.270 After all, Americans
hated the British and voted their hatred, but if Federalists regained
power in the House of Representatives and retained their power in
the Senate,271 they could appropriate money for the British debts
when tempers cooled without courts forcing them to do so.272
Federalists might also have believed that the thriving state debt
market would redistribute the state debt claims to in-state plaintiffs,
thus nullifying any potential domestic protectionist effect of enacting
the Eleventh Amendment.273
On the other hand, if the states actually meant the Eleventh
Amendment to bar state securities claims, Federalists might simply
have bowed to political pressure.274 Each pro-creditor Federalist had
a political incentive to protect his own constituency and in-state

267. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 4, 70.
268. Id. at 74; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 51.
269. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71; Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369.
270. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1932–33.
271. Partisan identification in the 1790s was not an exact science, but Federalists generally
had power in the Senate after the 1792 elections, but clearly lost power in the House. MCDONALD,
supra note 119, at 106–07.
272. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71; see also Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369–70; Nowak, supra
note 173, at 1440 (“However, the near-unanimous Federalist support for the amendment is
understandable if they believed that Congress would retain the power to grant such jurisdiction in
order to effectuate federal powers and goals.”).
273. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1281.
274. Massey, supra note 177, at 113.
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creditors at the expense of out-of-state creditors.275 Though most
debtholders resided in the states that owed them, the speculation
market concentrated most state debt outside each state.276 According
to Lawrence Marshall:
As elected officials, the congressmen and senators who voted for
the bill proposing the eleventh amendment were probably
conscious of their constituents’ anticipated response to the
amendment. In any event, they certainly wanted to create an
amendment that would be ratified by the states. For the typical
voter, the amendment as drafted was a relatively costless
provision; it did not affect his right to invoke federal jurisdiction
in suits against his own state, but spared his state from being
subject to federal jurisdiction in suits by outsiders. Had the
amendment immunized states from all suits, on the other hand, it
would have directly affected in-state citizens, and might have
triggered opposition.277

The Eleventh Amendment protected states by precluding federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases with out-of-state
plaintiffs, thereby allowing state courts, or state legislatures, to decide
whether to pay the out-of-state creditors.278 In-state plaintiffs, the
voting constituency within each state, kept their claims.279
Regardless of why Federalists supported it, the Eleventh
Amendment still allowed Federalist majorities in each state to pay the
public debt, at least to most creditors and specifically to each
Federalist’s constituency. Moreover, Federalists could support the
Eleventh Amendment without further upsetting the British because

275. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1367–70.
276. See JACOBS, supra note 133, at 24, 71–72. Obligations by some states with large debt
markets, such as New York, largely remained within the state. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 258.
277. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369–70.
278. Id.
279. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71–72. The Eleventh Amendment does not mention in-state
plaintiffs. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
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Jay was simultaneously negotiating a treaty to rectify the dire
situation. Hence, Federalists in state legislatures knew that if both the
Jay Treaty and the Eleventh Amendment became law that the
national government would pay the state obligations. Indeed,
Federalists might have supported the Eleventh Amendment in order
to limit Jay’s negotiating positions to national solutions.280 After all, if
states would not pay British claims, the national government would
step in, thereby growing in power—a boon to Federalists.281 In this
way, although the Eleventh Amendment radically altered the
national government that Washington, Jay, and other Framers
envisioned,282 its passage was not simply a Democratic-Republican
victory.
E. The Unsung History of the Eleventh Amendment
In the Treaty of Peace, Americans bought peace with promises to
pay British creditors. Amid mounting anger at British military action
and fear of litigation from British creditors, Congress carefully
selected the wording of a constitutional amendment to protect states
from a volley of suits filed by British creditors with claims under the
Treaty of Peace.283 This was no mere coincidence. John Jay—
negotiator of the Treaty of Peace, critic of discriminatory state
practices, influence on the new Constitution, and Chief Justice of a
court claiming the power to hold states to account—had scared the
states and Congress into passing the Eleventh Amendment. The
states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to overrule Chisholm, which
suggested that the Court would hold states to account for breaches of

280.
281.
282.
283.

See MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 144.
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116.
COMBS, supra note 44, at 61.
ORTH, supra note 107, at 7.
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treaties, by preventing out-of-state plaintiffs from bringing claims
based on either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. But,
contrary to what many legal scholars and judges contend, Chisholm
did not directly spur the Eleventh Amendment, though it did lay the
groundwork for a hysteria that indirectly resulted in it. States
legislatures were not very worried about domestic debt; rather, they
were concerned about debt to British creditors and by the specter of
federal courts forcing them to pay those debts.
The Eleventh Amendment was not a simple or knee-jerk creation.
It responded precisely to a constellation of concerns within
American political parties over contemporaneous international crises
and competing conceptions of the nation’s new federal constitutional
structure. That foreign policy history has implications for modern
interpretation.
IV
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Despite the fact that interpretation of the Constitution based on
original meaning is fraught with challenges, originalism has become
the language of debate on the Court concerning the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment.284 In the case of the Eleventh Amendment,
these challenges are exacerbated because of a near total lack of
documentation from ratifying state legislatures.285 Scholars
examining the modern jurisprudence of the Treaty Power and
Eleventh Amendment have thus based much of their analysis on an

284. Hart & Sigmon, supra note 12. Even Justice Antonin Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist
on statutory matters, has abandoned the text of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of historical
explanations. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
285. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1350.
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incomplete historical account.286 Legal scholars have generally
mischaracterized Chisholm’s relationship to the Eleventh
Amendment either by relying on incorrect facts or emphasizing the
Eleventh Amendment’s seemingly swift, overwhelming ratification
without considering its one-year delay from Chisholm or its role as
an act of commercial retaliation during a war crisis. Some of these
inaccuracies are understandable because leading history books fail to
explain the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification.287 Other inaccuracies
are understandable because Eleventh Amendment and state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is confusing and exhausting.288
Finally, the relationship between the Treaty of Peace and the
Eleventh Amendment is easily overlooked, despite having been well
established by historians, because the Eleventh Amendment itself is
cast in generic terms that do not immediately alert readers to its
foreign policy implications.
The Eleventh Amendment’s foreign policy implications can help
legal scholars and judges understand the Amendment’s meaning and
that of the Treaty Power. The history of the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment shows that its current jurisprudence is likely
not well-founded in history and, further, that the original meaning of
the Treaty Power, whatever it was, cannot fully control Treaty Power
jurisprudence. The meaning of the Treaty Power must include its
circumscription by the Eleventh Amendment; the original meaning
286. The incompleteness of the record has not hindered, and has perhaps helped, different
scholars’ adoption of various interpretations of amendment. ORTH, supra note 107, at 28 (“The
search for the original understanding on state sovereign immunity bears this much resemblance
to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found so that the faithful of whatever
persuasion can find their heart’s desire.”).
287. See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116. Historians, for their part, might be
reluctant to consider the history of an amendment so poorly documented. Marshall, supra note 9,
at 1350.
288. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV.
47, 47 (1998) (“As everyone knows, the Eleventh Amendment is a mess.”).
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A. Interpreting the Treaty Power
Treaty Power nationalists trumpet Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v.
Holland to argue that federalism cannot limit the Treaty Power.289
But Justice Holmes’ opinion indicates that prohibitory words within
the Constitution can control the scope of the Treaty Power,290 and the
Eleventh Amendment’s text specifies when federal courts lack
jurisdiction over claims against states. The states ratified the Eleventh
Amendment to nullify specific terms in the Treaty of Peace and to
cut off the President and Senate’s ability to together authorize federal
courts to hear cases against states. That is, in order to overturn John
Jay’s vision of the Treaty Power, the Eleventh Amendment overruled
the balance espoused in Chisholm that, as to the purposes of the
Union, the states are not sovereign.291 The Eleventh Amendment
specifically curbed national treatymaking power despite the thenvigorous representation of state interests in the Senate to alter the
supremacy of the national government in foreign relations. Hence,
the Eleventh Amendment offers exactly the kind of prohibitory
words that Holmes contemplated in Holland. Scholars like Golove
and Bradley, who debate the nature of the Treaty Power, should
consider this history.
Treaty Power nationalists describe two principal problems with
the application of the Eleventh Amendment to the Treaty Power:
“limiting the remedies against the states generally undermines treaty
supremacy and calls into question U.S. performance of its primary

289. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 5, at 1257.
290. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
291. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793).

H 272 I

04__SCHWAIGER.DOC

VOL. 2

11/1/2007 3:54:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2007

obligations,” and “state sovereign immunity may breach U.S.
undertakings directly relating to remedies.”292 Indeed, state discretion
to exercise sovereign immunity against treaty-based claims could
invite destruction of the Union.293 Thus, if the national government
has negotiated a deal with a foreign power that governs local affairs,
states cannot have discretion in their adherence, because that would
invite a relationship between the foreign power and the domestic
state.294 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States
experienced tremendous difficulty reconciling its treaty-based
obligations and its constitutional structure.295 In no small part, the
Framers specifically designed the Supremacy Clause to mitigate these
problems in the hope that it would prevent these problems from
dragging the United States into another war with Britain.296
But the Framers of the Supremacy Clause did not have the last
word on the national government’s power to make treaties. Whether
believing in foreign affairs exceptionalism,297 or that states already
have a sufficient role in the crafting of treaties,298 Treaty Power
nationalists ignore an important motivation behind the Eleventh
Amendment—to create exactly the problems that Treaty Power
nationalists associate with states overruling international treaties.
The Eleventh Amendment radically altered the balance struck at the
Framing between the state and national governments, and Treaty

292. Swaine, supra note 61, at 438.
293. Golove, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[P]ermitting states to carry on formal diplomatic contacts
and enter into separate relationships with foreign powers raises the prospect of foreign intrigue, of
divided loyalties, and of conflict and competition among the states.”).
294. Id.
295. See generally Jay Report, supra note 47.
296. STAHR, supra note 2, at 205–06, 246.
297. Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 534.
298. Bandes, supra note 32, at 748.
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Power nationalists have turned a blind eye to that history.299 Though
the Eleventh Amendment renders treaty obligations problematic,
that is no reason to allow the Treaty Power to undercut the Eleventh
Amendment. Rather, it is a reason to allow the Eleventh Amendment
to undercut the Treaty Power.
Remarkably, federalists have also ignored this history, despite its
support of their position.300 Bradley makes a case for limited Treaty
Power by considering the invisible radiations of the Tenth
Amendment, the unwritten and abstract notions of federalism, and
recent Eleventh Amendment Court doctrine.301 Such an argument
seeks to overturn or at least skirt around Holland, which allows the
national government to make treaties that do not contravene any
specific part of the Constitution.302 But federalists like Bradley could
instead embrace Holland and its counterpart, Reid, which prevents
the national government from making treaties that contravene
specific provisions of the Constitution.303 By doing so, federalists
could abandon the invisible radiations of the Tenth Amendment and
unwritten notions of federalism to instead rely on the Eleventh
Amendment as a “specific provision” preventing the national
government from making certain treaty provisions. The specificity of

299. A particularly egregious omission is in a piece by Cory Eichhorn concerning the
relationship between treaties and state sovereign immunity where he describes only the domestic
implications of Chisholm. See Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 526–27.
300. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3. Bradley does treat current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence in both of his articles. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 117 nn.117–24;
Bradley, supra note 3, at 458 nn.379–84.
301. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3. Even if federalists accept Holland’s test,
the history of the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates that it should be considered explicit
prohibitory words. That is, the logic of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), would recognize the
explicit bar to federal court jurisdiction enunciated in the Eleventh Amendment. See Dodson,
supra note 60, at 758. Indeed, in doing so, Treaty Power federalists could suggest an even more
expansive view of state sovereign immunity against claims arising solely under treaties.
302. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
303. Id. at 41.
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the Eleventh Amendment as a barrier to treatymaking, especially in
light of its history as a foreign policy instrument, suggests it would
fall on the Reid side of the specificity test rather than the Holland
side.304 Hence, if Bradley and other federalists consider the barriers
erected in the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from treatybased claims, they could argue that federal courts lack jurisdiction
over claims against states brought under a treaty, not just under
statute. This would protect states from causes of action under
treaties.305
B. Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment
After two hundred years, scholars and courts still hotly dispute
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. While scholars have
written articles advancing a variety of theories of the Eleventh
Amendment,306 two theories presently have currency in the U.S.
Supreme Court—the “profound shock” and “diversity” theories.307
The profound shock theory holds that the Eleventh Amendment
reaffirmed the Framers’ understanding of state sovereign
immunity.308 The diversity theory holds that the Eleventh

304. Some federalists might argue more strongly still that the Eleventh Amendment could
serve as a “specific provision” taproot for state sovereign immunity. That position would be
tenuous given that the history of the Eleventh Amendment, which serves to identify it as a barrier
to treaty-making, indicates that it was not intended to enact general sovereign immunity.
305. See supra Part II.A.
306. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Nowak, supra note 173; Pfander, supra note 135.
307. For a short explanation of both of these theories, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 198, at
185–90. For fuller explanations of the theories see, for the diversity theory, Fletcher, supra note
71; Fletcher, supra note 12. For the profound shock theory, see WARREN, supra note 12, at 96.
308. The Profound Shock Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants.

Diversity Jurisdiction
Federal Question Jurisdiction

In-State Plaintiff

Out-of-State Plaintiff

N/A

Barred by 11th Amendment

Barred by 11th Amendment

Barred by 11th Amendment
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Amendment merely removed the Court’s grant of diversity
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.309
The foreign policy history of the Eleventh Amendment indicates
that neither theory is correct. Rather, it indicates that the Eleventh
Amendment bars all legal and equitable claims made by an out-ofstate plaintiff against a state, regardless of whether the suit is brought
pursuant to federal question or diversity jurisdiction.310 This meaning
comports with the political realities of the early and mid-1790s311
and, not coincidentally, agrees with the “plain language” of the
Eleventh Amendment.312
Consider the profound shock theory. According to Judge
Gibbons, the profound shock theory is the result of a wholly
inaccurate and politically motivated historical account.313 Gibbons

309. The Diversity Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants.

Diversity Jurisdiction
Federal Question Jurisdiction

In-State Plaintiff

Out-of-State Plaintiff

N/A

Barred by 11th Amendment

Allowed

Allowed

310. For a full explanation of this theory, see generally Marshall, supra note 9. This Foreign
Policy Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants.

Diversity Jurisdiction
Federal Question Jurisdiction

In-State Plaintiff

Out-of-State Plaintiff

N/A

Barred by 11th Amendment

Allowed

Barred by 11th Amendment

311. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355. This reading also keeps with John Manning’s argument
that precise constitutional texts must be read precisely because they are the result of political
compromises meant to protect constitutional minority positions. See generally John F. Manning,
The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663
(2004) (discussing the importance of recognizing the plausibility of selected language as a precise
compromise in the case of the Eleventh Amendment).
312. See Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355. Although I recognize that all language has ambiguity,
I respectfully submit that the foreign policy history of the Eleventh Amendment comports with a
reading of the amendment that is much plainer and simpler than that of Hans or diversity
theorists’.
313. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1893–94, 1989–2002.
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argues that the Hans Court redefined state sovereign immunity to
reassure the securities market after the financial and political
meltdown of Civil War debt repudiation.314 To do so, it invented the
idea that Chisholm had profoundly shocked the nation’s beliefs in the
fundamental structure of federalism,315 instead of simply frightening
the states with the notion that they might have to pay British
creditors.
But the Eleventh Amendment probably did not reaffirm a
generally shared conception of state sovereign immunity.316 The
profound shock theory of the Eleventh Amendment garners approval
based on the false fact that the Eleventh Amendment passed quickly
and with little controversy.317 This account gives short shrift to the
consideration Congress gave to the amendment, the international
context of state ratifications, the nuance of Federalist political
posturing, and the lack of a cohesive vision of state sovereignty
among the Framers.318 It is true that, shortly after the Justices
announced their opinions in Chisholm, a U.S. Representative
proposed an amendment barring suit against states in federal courts
by any person.319 The next day, a U.S. Senator proposed a similar
amendment.320 But Congress then tabled the measures for nearly a

314. Id. at 1989–2002.
315. Id. at 2001.
316. According to some scholars, the Eleventh Amendment created subject matter
jurisdiction restrictions on the federal courts despite the Framers’ original understanding of
sovereign immunity in terms of personal jurisdiction. See generally Nelson, supra note 306.
Others contend that the narrow and precise formulation of the Eleventh Amendment suggests a
negative implication for other forms of sovereign immunity. See generally Manning, supra note
311.
317. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 4.
318. See generally RAKOVE, supra note 32; WOOD, supra note 129.
319. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296.
320. Id.
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year amid decidedly split public and partisan opinion.321 When a
similar resolution was reintroduced while anti-British sentiments
simmered over cases filed during the course of the previous year,
Congress still considered the matter for two months, rejecting a
series of amendments to the resolution before passing it on to the
states.322 The states ratified the amendment in a fit of anti-British
hysteria in the midst of a war crisis and in large part because
Federalists wanted to maintain or grow political power. Reaction was
by no means swift or simple.323
Moreover, the Hans Court’s historical account of Chisholm and of
the Framers’ conceptions of state sovereignty is almost certainly
wrong.324 While the Framers at the Constitutional Convention did
not explicitly consider the key clause, “controversies between a state
and citizens of another state,” both Justice Wilson’s opinion and U.S.
Attorney General Edmund Randolph’s argument in Chisholm are
instructive.325 Both Wilson and Randolph served on the five-member
committee of detail that wrote the clause;326 both advanced strongly
Federalist understandings of the Court’s jurisdiction in Chisholm. At
the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson said, “When a
citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a
tribunal where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing.”327
Edmund Randolph had similarly remarked at the Virginia ratifying

321. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1435.
322. See supra Part III.B–C; 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794).
323. Even Georgia, the defendant in the case, reacted slowly to Chisholm. Georgia’s House
only passed legislation nine months after the opinion in Chisholm was handed down. See 5 DHSC,
supra note 151, at 135.
324. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1349–50.
325. ORTH, supra note 107, at 23.
326. Id.
327. As quoted in id.
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convention that, “I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay her
debts.”328
Although the profound shock theory of the Eleventh Amendment
has held sway for over a century since Hans, in the 1980s and 1990s,
the diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment gained currency
with the Court. Like the profound shock theory, the diversity
explanation holds that the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to
overrule the Court’s holding in Chisholm.329 The diversity theory
differs from the profound shock theory by positing that the states
ratified the Eleventh Amendment to accomplish that goal by only
negating the Court’s claim of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution.330 It posits that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar claims brought under federal question or
other forms of jurisdiction.331
The principle difficulty with the diversity theory is that it fails to
address the fact that legislators must have been worried about federal
claims.332 Diversity theorists posit that original federal question

328. As quoted in id. Of course, similar remarks were made on the other side of the coin by
Hamilton in the Federalist papers and by Marshall and Madison at the Virginia ratifying
convention. Id. at 24–25, 36–37; see JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533.
Such statements may not have been entirely true. See Kramer, supra note 12; Massey, supra note
177, at 95.
329. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1263.
330. Id. at 1264 (“In more complicated but precise terms, the amendment required that the
state-citizen diversity clause be construed to authorize jurisdiction only when the state was a
plaintiff; when the state was a defendant, the clause was not to be construed to authorize
jurisdiction.”); Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1035–36.
331. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1342–43; contra Pfander, supra note 135, at 1344. Indeed, Jay
himself struck down state statutes based on the Contract Clause as part of a pattern that alarmed
state legislatures to growing federal power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 291 n.52.
332. See Massey, supra note 177, at 117–19 (discussing the clear desires of Georgia, Virginia,
and Massachusetts to be free from liability for federal claims).
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jurisdiction was not established even as a concept during the 1790s.333
This position is incorrect. Legislators worried about federal
constitutional claims based on both the Contracts Clause and the Ex
Post Facto Clause.334 But even if state legislators were not concerned
that domestic creditors might reframe denied contract claims as
constitutional claims requiring federal court intervention,335 they
must have been concerned that foreign creditors would bring federal
question claims based on the Treaty of Peace.336 State legislatures
suffered from major anti-British hysteria over potential claims under
the Treaty of Peace.337 Treaty-based claims were almost certainly
federal questions;338 surely, they would have been treated as such had
the Chisholm Court faced the question.
These treaty-based claims become a large problem for the
diversity theory when considering assignment of claims.339
Assignment is the process by which a claim or cause of action can be
sold or given to another individual, who may then sue on the
claim.340 Assignment of claims thrived in debt markets during the
early Federalist Era. Creditors of states could sell their claims across

333. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1264. The Judiciary Act gave the U.S. Supreme Court appellate
federal question jurisdiction, but made no mention of original federal question jurisdiction. Id. at
1267–68.
334. Marshall, supra note 12, at 1381–82.
335. Pfander, supra note 135, at 1344.
336. Id. at 1361.
337. See supra Part III.
338. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1281.
339. Contra Pfander, supra note 135, at 1360–61. In arguing that the Eleventh Amendment
closed the loophole of assignment and gave control back to state legislatures and state courts,
Pfander assumes that creditors’ contract claims against states could not have been brought as
federal questions, an assumption that is at best controversial given the opinions of the federal
judiciary, and especially those of Chief Justice John Jay. See STAHR, supra note 2, at 291 n.52.
340. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004) (assuming a claim or cause of action is a
right or property that can be transferred).
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borders; much of it concentrated in New York.341 As soon as states
began repudiating this debt, these claims transformed into federal
question claims under the Contracts Clause, which prevented states
from interfering with existing contracts.342 Hence, by selling
repudiated state debt, private parties could sell federal question
claims.343
The diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment allows federal
question jurisdiction regardless of whether a plaintiff is in-state or
out-of-state.344 The primary historical argument for this treatment is
that it makes no sense to discriminate against out-of-state plaintiffs,
because they could assign claims to in-state plaintiffs, who could in
turn bring suit.345 According to diversity theorists, because states
would still pay in-state plaintiffs who brought federal question claims
purchased from out-of-state creditors, it is absurd to deny out-of
state plaintiffs the chance to bring their suits directly via federal
question jurisdiction.346
Diversity theorists fail to consider, though, that not all out-ofstate plaintiffs could have assigned claims. British plaintiffs—those

341. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 258. Philadelphia and Boston were also centers of
speculation trade. Id. at 252.
342. The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III, INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE
(Boston), Feb. 6, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 253, 256–57 (“By a piece of artifice,
the Securities may be nominally transferred out of the State, for the purpose of supporting an
action in the Federal Court, and will no doubt be thus managed.”)
343. This further erodes the historical foundation for the diversity theory of the Eleventh
Amendment. If out-of-state creditors had federal question claims, a bar to just diversity
jurisdiction would not have prevented them from bringing suit. I thank Chris Hart for reminding
me of the point.
344. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1282.
345. Id. at 1281; see “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 342, at 256–57.
346. There are some potential reasons under the diversity theory for treating federal question
claims differently between in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs. Such treatment would profit in-state
plaintiffs, who could purchase the out-of-state claims. Each state would pay back its debt to its
own citizens, profiting them rather than out-of-state speculators.
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most feared financially and politically—were completely or
effectively barred from assignment. Because of this bar, it was
reasonable to treat federal question claims differently based on the
plaintiff’s home. Barring federal question claims by out-of-state
plaintiffs effectively barred all British creditors’ claims while not
necessarily affecting American debtholders’ ability to sell their claims
to in-state plaintiffs.
British creditors could not assign their claims to in-state
plaintiffs. Many state laws specifically precluded the sale of property
by Loyalists, Tories, and British creditors.347 Though legislatures and
courts relaxed many of these laws after the Revolution, many states
maintained the de facto denial of rights to Loyalists, Tories, and
British creditors. In some places, the scope of those denied access to
courts included even those merely insufficiently patriotic.348
According to Claude Halstead Van Tyne:
In the courts of law, not even the rights of a foreigner were left to
the loyalist. If his neighbors owed him money . . . . All legal action
was denied him. He might be assaulted, insulted, blackmailed or
slandered, though the law did not state it so baldly, yet he had no
recourse in law.349

Even if a British creditor could legally assign his treaty-based claim,
he would still face substantial practical obstacles. The first and most
obvious problem for a British creditor would be finding a local
American friend in an environment of deep suspicion and
occasionally violent prejudice.350 Most Americans already harbored a

347. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 275.
348. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 352–53 (discussing treatment by Massachusetts of William
Vassall). Indeed, Vassall might have been treated even more poorly than most Loyalists—he was
not even allowed to return to Massachusetts after Massachusetts began allowing Loyalists to
return in March 1784. Id. at 357.
349. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 193.
350. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70–71.
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great deal of animosity toward creditors who had purchased
Revolutionary War debt certificates from veterans, orphans, and
widows at steeply reduced prices.351 Few, if any, Americans would
have been willing to walk into federal court to seek redress for a
claim purchased from an opponent of the American Revolution.
Such an action would risk branding the American as a Loyalist, or at
least a British sympathizer.352 Additionally, there would be little
chance of a fair trial even if the British creditor’s claim got into
court—jurors were drawn from the public and thus shared its
dispositions, fears, and prejudices.353 Anyone who did not share these
proclivities would probably have been kept from the jury,354 or, if
placed on the jury, would feel threatened for supporting British
claims.355 Attorneys, too, shared anti-British sentiments, not least
because the bar associations in many states had purged themselves of
British sympathizers during the Revolution.356 Even the remaining
attorneys were not safe—after Cornwallis’ surrender, American
attorneys representing British merchants or Loyalists were physically
attacked for bringing claims in state courts.357 As if the chances of
finding a brave and fair-minded jury, judge, and attorney were not
slim enough, the assignee would also have to enlist the help of
witnesses, and few witnesses would have been friendly to British

351. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116–17.
352. See generally VAN TYNE, supra note 144.
353. Id. at 194.
354. Id. (discussing Tories and jury selection during the American Revolution).
355. HAROLD M. HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 91
(1960) (discussing that, during the Revolutionary War, “It took a brave grand juror to taint
himself by freeing persons accused of disloyalty, and an even braver attorney to risk his own
freedom and career by defending a nonjuring, self-proclaimed ‘enemy to American liberty’”).
356. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 195–96.
357. Holt, supra note 114, at 1440–41.
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creditors.358 All in all, British creditors would have had a very difficult
time getting claims successfully assigned and won.
If the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to prevent
enforcement of claims under the Treaty of Peace, the Eleventh
Amendment should apply to out-of-state plaintiffs bringing either
federal question claims or diversity claims. Because British creditors
could not assign their federal question claims under the treaty, such a
jurisdictional bar would preclude these claims from ever being filed
in federal court. Contemporaneous understandings of the Eleventh
Amendment bear out this interpretation.359 Such discrimination
against out-of-state plaintiffs would have eliminated the most reviled
claims against the states—those financially large, politically charged
claims of the British creditors—while not preventing American
debtholders from assigning their claims to in-state plaintiffs.360
Under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment, once these in-state
plaintiffs acquired the federal question claims from out-of-state
American creditors, they could still bring suit under federal question
jurisdiction as in-state parties.361

358. RYERSON, supra note 137, at 169 (discussing how Loyalists lacked friendly American
witnesses to prove their claims before the British commissions).
359. According to the judge:
[T]he American people have decided, that it is no cause of offence to foreign nations, to
have their causes decided, and exclusively and finally decided, by the state tribunals. In
that amendment to the constitution, by which the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is
prohibited, in suits brought against the states, by foreign citizens or subjects, this
construction is most undoubted, and has never been complained of. Since the adoption
of that amendment, the election of jurisdictions has been entirely taken away from
foreigners, in all suits against the states, and those suits can, now, be only brought in the
state courts, in exclusion of every other: and that, too, in cases in which, from the
circumstance of the states themselves being parties, it might, perhaps, be plausibly
argued, that the judges of the state courts were not free from bias.
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 23 (1815).
360. See supra Part III.D.2.
361. See id.
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V
CONCLUSION
The debate between Treaty Power nationalists and Treaty Power
federalists has been ongoing since the Framing. Today, Treaty Power
nationalists rely on a vision of state sovereign immunity that does not
gel with the history of the Eleventh Amendment. On the other side,
Treaty Power federalists ignore the foreign policy history of how the
Eleventh Amendment changed the Treaty Power, even though that
history would substantially bolster their position. By protecting states
from foreign creditors with potential claims based on the Treaty of
Peace, the Eleventh Amendment nullified specific provisions of the
treaty and prevented the President and Senate from trading the keys
to state treasuries for peace with Britain in the Jay Treaty. In doing
so, the Eleventh Amendment altered the contours of the nationalstate balance of the Constitution, especially as it relates to the Treaty
Power. Because the Eleventh Amendment delimits the Treaty Power,
federalists need not try to limit it by constructing an abstraction of
federalism based on the “invisible radiations” of the Tenth
Amendment or implicit constitutional structures. Treaty Power
federalists should instead rely on the very visible radiations of the
Eleventh Amendment.
The often-ignored history of the Eleventh Amendment as a
reaction to the Treaty of Peace indicates that the Treaty Power is a
wholly inappropriate vehicle with which to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. It also indicates that the Eleventh Amendment might well
mean what it says. In a calculated move to cut off British creditors
from federal courts, the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to
take away the federal judiciary’s constitutional grant of diversity and
federal question jurisdiction when out-of-state plaintiffs sue states,
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but left in-state plaintiffs with the capacity to bring federal question
claims against states.
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